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Prior literature provides evidence that accounting beta risk measures—based on the
covariance between firm-specific and marketwide accounting rates of return—better estimate
the risk implied by market prices than do stock returns beta risk estimates based on
realized equity returns. Because capital markets might distort the realized equity return
inputs used by traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model implementations, prior literature
suggests that accounting rates of return might better capture the risk associated with firms’
future earnings. I hypothesize that accounting policies can also distort accounting betas.
I examine whether the price deviations for value estimates based on accounting betas are
associated with firms’ unconditional accounting conservatism and past investment growth.
Specifically, I document that accounting betas based on return on equity are negatively
associated with a firm’s combined level of conservative accounting and the absolute value of
the firm’s past investment growth. Further, I find that the conservative accounting and past
investment growth distortion in accounting betas outweighs the benefit of using accounting
betas relative to stock returns betas. The evidence suggests that accounting betas best
estimate risk when firms have less conservative accounting policies and smaller magnitudes
of absolute past investment growth.
To Amy, Arim, and Emma
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In all but the most primitive valuation approaches such as the use of earnings multiples,
calculating firm value essentially involves two tasks. The first task is to forecast a firm’s
future cash flows, and the second is to determine the rate of return required to discount the
cash flows back to their present values. Although forecasting and risk analysis are widely
considered the provinces of statisticians and researchers in asset pricing, alternatively they
can be considered exercises in accounting for a firm’s future (Penman, 2010a). Both forecast
estimates and risk estimates are derived from observables that are presumed to proxy for the
key parameters in theoretical forecast and risk models.1 Since the conceptual documents of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB) suggest that a purpose of accounting is to help financial statement users
forecast and assess the timing and uncertainty of future cash flows, accounting should
provide the observable firm characteristics to proxy for the key parameters in the set of
forecast and risk models that are used by investors.2
Although a purpose of accounting is to aid in firm valuation, accounting represents
a design choice by the firm and by standard-setters. A broad research question is then
which accounting best facilitates valuation. A standard feature of U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) is the measurement and estimation of accruals. Accruals
are used to improve a firm’s periodic earnings measurement by better matching the revenues
of business activities with their corresponding expenses. Despite accrual accounting’s
1Both forecasting and risk determination draw from the hypothesized relationships of the expected
conditional distributions of key parameters. Forecasts derive their predictions from an application of the
expected parameter relationships to current observables, and risk derives from the expected distribution of
the errors in those predictions based on prior realizations (Penman, 2010a).
2FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 and Chapter 1 of the IASB Conceptual
Framework simultaneously suggest that the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide
financial information to investors to allow them to assess the amount, timing, and uncertainty of future cash
flows.
2objectives, revenue and expense recognition remains at least partially subjective because
it relies on estimates.3 To the extent that the accrual estimates are imprecise, they might
distort the forecast and risk models that use them as inputs. U.S. GAAP specifies accrual
estimates that vary across different classes of assets and liabilities. For example, due to the
uncertainty of returns associated with firms’ advertising expenditures, U.S. GAAP requires
firms to immediately expense rather than capitalize such expenditures. Another example
is fair value accounting that values assets or liabilities according to their current market
rates so that interperiod accruals might be recognized even in periods when they might
be expected to reverse in subsequent periods that the firm carries the asset or liability.4
I examine how one broad set of accrual recognition methods, which I label conservative
accounting, might affect risk analysis in valuation.
I restrict my examination to the effects of conservative accounting on rate of return
estimates that are derived from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM
represents a traditional approach to modeling investment risk based on the covariance be-
tween an investment’s return and the return obtained from a market-mimicking investment
portfolio. Although prior literature suggests that the CAPM might not adequately model
investment risk as implied by market returns, I focus on the CAPM in my analysis for two
reasons. First, as stated previously, an objective of accounting is to provide the observables
necessary to proxy for the key parameters among the set of risk models that are used
by investors. Despite its limitations, the CAPM remains among the most popular risk
models used by corporate managers to assess risk (Graham & Harvey, 2001). Second,
recent literature suggests that the CAPM yields, on average, superior risk estimates when
it is derived using accounting estimates of firm and market portfolio returns than when it
is derived using stock market estimates of firm and market portfolio returns.
Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) and Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009) provide evi-
dence that CAPM estimates derived from the estimated covariances between firm-specific
accounting return on equity (ROE) and marketwide accounting return on equity yield
valuation errors that are on average smaller than the traditional CAPM estimates derived
from firm-specific and marketwide stock returns. In general, the papers define valuation
3For example, it is impossible for accounting to precisely allocate a productive asset’s depreciable life to
its units of production because even a depreciation allocation method having a unit basis is unable to fully
accomodate the variance among the set of similar assets’ productive capacities.
4Fair value accounting is frequently used for financial instruments having active markets. The motivation
for fair value accounting is that it provides a better representation of value based on current market
conditions.
3errors as the differences between market-implied risk premiums and the premiums obtained
from risk estimates. The prior literatures’ findings suggest that investors should adopt
the accounting-based CAPM beta (accounting beta) as a superior alternative to the stock
returns-based CAPM beta (stock returns beta).5
I contribute to the literature by providing evidence that accounting betas are not only a
function of a firm’s systematic risk, but also of its firm-specific accrual accounting methods.
I provide evidence that suggests accounting-based measures of risk are predictably biased
by a common measurement technique used in accounting: the tendency to conservatively
report asset values and earnings. I examine whether the on average superior performance
of accounting betas over stock returns betas is associated with a firm’s level of conservative
accounting methods. I predict that conservative accounting, when combined with past in-
vestment growth, biases accounting betas so that firms having more conservative accounting
appear less risky than they actually are. Consequently, I also predict that accounting betas,
when estimated for firms having more conservative accounting, will, on average, yield larger
valuation errors than stock return betas that are estimated for the same set of firms.
I define conservative accounting as the set of accrual methods that reports an investment
at a carrying value that yields an accounting rate of return greater than the internal rate
of return based on the investment’s original cost.6 I predict that because conservative
accounting distorts accounting rates of return, it might also distort accounting betas.
Rajan, Reichelstein, and Soliman (2007) model the association between accounting rates of
return and a firm’s conservative accounting and past investment growth. They find that
in the presence of investment growth, an increase in conservative accounting reduces ROE
and magnifies the effect of any further increase in investment growth. Similarly, given
conservative accounting, an increase in investment growth reduces ROE and magnifies
the effect of any further increase in conservatism on ROE. To summarize, Rajan et al.
(2007) provide analytical and empirical evidence of a negative association between firms’
5Research has not yet examined the extent to which practitioners use risk estimates that are similar to
accounting beta. Some anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that accounting betas are used by practitioners.
For example, the Certified Valuator and Analyst test preparation materials discuss risk estimates that closely
resemble an accounting beta. Despite the limited evidence of accounting beta’s use in practice, I remain
motivated to investigate accounting beta to better understand how accounting might affect risk assessments,
especially those that might be based on the covariances of rates of return.
6In contrast to the conditional accounting conservatism literature (e.g., Basu, 1997), I use a definition
of accounting conservatism that is independent of future cash flow expectations. The immediate expensing
of advertising costs is an example of (unconditional) conservative accounting where the investment has an
immediate carrying value equal to zero and the possibility for an infinite accounting rate of return.
4accounting rates of return and the interaction between their conservative accounting and
past investment growth.
I extend the analysis of Rajan et al. (2007) to hypothesize that accounting betas are
negatively associated with a firm’s conservative accounting and the absolute value of its
past investment growth. To derive my predictions, I extend the Rajan et al. (2007) model
to include two additional assumptions. First, I assume that firms’ investment rates tend to
be procyclical (Stock & Watson, 1999). Second, I assume that firms with unbiased accrual
accounting have accounting rates of return that also tend to be procyclical. Combining
the Rajan et al. (2007) model predictions with these assumptions, a firm that applies
unbiased accrual accounting standards will observe increasing accounting rates of return
during economic expansion and decreasing accounting rates of return during economic
contraction. In contrast, due to the negative association between accounting rates of return
and the interaction between conservative accounting and past investment growth, as a
firm applies more conservative accrual accounting standards, it will observe an increasingly
negative bias in its accounting rate of return during periods of economic expansion and
an increasingly positive bias during periods of economic contraction. With the added
assumptions, conservative accounting combines with absolute investment growth to weaken
a firm’s accounting rate of return covariance with other firms. I therefore predict a negative
association between accounting beta estimates and a firm’s level of conservative accounting
and the absolute value of its past investment growth.
Following Rajan et al. (2007), I estimate a firm’s degree of conservative accounting as
an increasing function of the sum of its research and developement (R&D) and advertising
expenses divided by its total capital expenditures. Rajan et al. (2007) suggest that the
relevant period of investment growth for determining the extent of the bias in accounting
rates of return occurs over the average useful life of a firm’s assets. Similarly, I expect that
the relevant period of growth associated with the time-series bias in the ROE covariance of
accounting betas is also approximated by the average useful life of a firm’s assets. Therefore,
I follow Rajan et al. (2007) to also estimate past investment growth as the geometric
average growth in total expenditures over the average estimated useful life of a firm’s assets.
However, because I predict that the covariance between a firm’s ROE and the market’s ROE
is diminished as the firm applies more conservative accounting and either grows or shrinks
investment, I examine the absolute value of a firm’s average past investment growth.
I perform panel regressions of accounting betas on estimates for conservative accounting
and the absolute value of past investment growth, and I find evidence of a negative asso-
5ciation between accounting betas and the interaction between conservative accounting and
the absolute value of past investment growth. The evidence supports two possible inter-
pretations. First, firms that use more conservative accounting during periods of economic
expansion or contraction might be less risky than firms that use less conservative accounting
policies. Alternatively, conservative accounting might combine with economic expansion
or growth to weaken the covariance between firm and market ROE, as predicted, and
cause firms that have more assets or liabilities that are subject to conservative accounting
standards to have downwardly biased accounting betas.
To distinguish between these two interpretations, I compare the valuation errors for
accounting beta risk estimates to stock returns beta risk estimates. If stock returns beta
estimates are less vulnerable to the impact of conservative accounting and if they are
reasonable proxies for risk in their own right, I predict that their valuation errors will be
smaller than those of accounting beta estimates when they are estimated for conservative
accounting firms during periods of economic growth or contraction.7
Examining the valuation error differences between accounting beta and stock returns
beta provides evidence of the measurement distortion in accounting betas that is associated
with conservative accounting. It also investigates whether one risk measure is superior
in such settings. Although prior literature suggests that accounting betas are on average
superior risk estimates to stock returns betas, they might not be superior risk estimates
when they are used to estimate the risk of firms that have more conservative accounting.
Further, an examination of the valuation error differences between accounting beta and
stock returns beta might also provide evidence on another accrual accounting method: fair
value accounting. If stock returns are a sufficient proxy for fair value accounting rate
of return estimates, then stock return betas might also be considered fair value accounting
betas. The conclusions drawn from the valuation error differences between accounting betas
and stock return betas might then be interpreted as the differences between conservative
accounting betas and fair value accounting betas.
7Penman and Zhang (2002) document evidence that investors fail to immediately fully adjust for the
ROE distortion caused by accounting conservatism and investment growth so that they incorporate the
distortion into prices and subsequent returns. If the market is able to significantly adjust for the bias in
accounting rates of return due to conservative accounting and if the association between accounting betas
and conservative accounting and the absolute value of past investment growth is not associated with risk,
I would expect that stock return beta estimates would yield smaller valuation errors than accounting beta
estimates when they are estimated for firms that have more conservative accounting. In contrast, if I do not
observe significant valuation error differences between accounting betas and stock returns betas for firms
having more conservative accounting, I would be unable to distinguish between the risk explanation or the
market’s inability to sufficiently adjust for the conservative accounting bias that is present in accounting
rates of return.
6For my primary tests, I follow Cohen et al. (2009) to estimate valuation errors as the
residuals from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discounted simple realized future
market portfolio returns on either accounting beta or stock returns beta. Realized market
portfolio returns proxy for investors’ expected rates of return. In Chapter 5, I examine an
alternative valuation error estimate based on the residuals from a regression of an implied
cost of equity capital estimate on each beta measure. I derive similar conclusions using
either valuation error estimate.
I sort firm-year valuation error differences into two-dimensional quintile portfolios based
on each firm’s level of conservative accounting and absolute value of past investment growth.
I find that stock returns beta valuation errors are significantly smaller than accounting
beta valuation errors for portfolios of firms that have more conservative accounting and
greater absolute values of past investment growth. The evidence is consistent not only with
the presence of conservative accounting distortions in accounting betas during periods of
economic expansion or contraction, but also with stock returns betas providing superior
risk estimates for firms that have more conservative accounting during periods of increasing
or decreasing past investment growth.
To summarize, I contribute to the literature by exploring the extent to which accrual
accounting methods distort accounting beta risk estimates. To my knowledge, I am the first
to examine the association between accounting measurement attributes and accounting beta
risk estimates. I document evidence that investors should consider firms’ accrual accounting
methods when using accounting-based risk estimates to assess firm risk. Further, when
evaluating and comparing the relative valuation errors of accounting-based and market-
based risk estimates, my results suggest that the relative superiority of accounting-based
risk estimates is contextual. While prior research suggests that, on average, accounting
beta estimates are superior to stock returns beta estimates, my findings suggests that by
understanding the impact of accounting conservatism and investment growth on accounting
betas, practitioners and researchers can better choose the appropriate risk measure. My
results suggest that (1) accounting betas are negatively biased by conservative accounting
and (2) that stock returns betas provide a superior meaure of risk over accounting betas for
firms that use more conservative accounting during periods of highly fluctuating economic
growth.
The remainder of my dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the CAPM
and more recent accounting beta literature. Chapter 3 develops my primary hypotheses and
conducts the related tests. Chapter 4 provides robustness tests of these results. In Chapter
75, I use an implied cost of equity capital estimate to derive an alternative valuation error
estimate. I use the alternative estimate to examine independent tests of the accounting beta
valuation error that do not rely on a comparison to stock returns beta. In general, the tests
support my examination of the valuation error differences between accounting beta and




Standard valuation involves two primary tasks that are readily demonstrable via the







where (E(dt+τ )) is the expected dividend or cash flow generated by the asset in period t+τ
and δ is equal to one plus a constant discount rate. The two valuation tasks required to
estimate the model are (1) forecasting future cash flows or dividends and (2) estimating the
discount rate that will incorporate future cash flow uncertainty into the model. My research
objective is to examine which accounting best facilitates valuation. I focus specifically on
how accrual recognition methods affect discount rate, or cost of capital, estimates.
I restrict my examination to the effects of conservative accounting on cost of capital
estimates derived using the CAPM. In this chapter, I review the CAPM literature, includ-
ing the debate over the model’s theoretical and empirical validity.1 I argue that despite
the CAPM’s empirical shortcomings, its simplicity and thoroughly examined theoretical
underpinnings motivate its continued extensive use in the classroom and in practice as a
tool for evaluating investment risk (Fama & French, 2004; Graham & Harvey, 2001). After
briefly reviewing the progression of the CAPM debate and its current status in the literature,
I then introduce and discuss the recent motivation for an empirical accounting alternative
to stock returns beta. I conclude the chapter by motivating my analysis of the contextual
precision of this accounting alternative.
2.1 The CAPM
CAPM was developed based on mean-variance efficient portfolio choice theory that
assumes investors are risk-averse rational utility-maximizers that care only about the mean
1For a more extensive review of this literature, see Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) and Fama and
French (2004).
9and variance of their investment choices (Markowitz, 1959). Investors’ behavior leads them
to maximize utility by choosing among the set of investment portfolios that have the highest
expected return for a given expected return variance. Extant literature refers to these
portfolios as the set of mean-variance efficient portfolios.
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) extend mean-variance efficient portfolio choice theory
to identify a portfolio that must be mean-variance efficient in order to clear the market
of all assets. They assume that investors hold homogeneous expectations of the expected
future joint distribution of asset returns and that investors’ expectations are fully rational
so that the agreed-upon distribution reflects economic reality. They also assume investors
can borrow unlimited amounts at the risk-free rate, and that the market is frictionless
so that it will not prevent efficient trading. After imposing these additional assumptions,
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) find that investors’ set of mean-variance efficient portfolio
choices collapses to a linear set of choices where the different portfolios are all comprised of
various weightings between the risk-free asset and a single tangency portfolio in the same
relative proportions. The derivation of a linear set of portfolio choices obtains due to the
assumption that investors hold homogeneous expectations so that all investors, irrespective
of their level of risk aversion, hold a weighted portfolio of the risk-free asset and the unique
tangency portfolio. Because all investors hold the same tangency portfolio combined with
the risk-free investment, the tangency portfolio must be the value-weighted market portfolio
in order to allow the set of all market assets to clear.
The implications of the Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) analysis are that the market
portfolio is among the set of mean-variance efficient portfolios and that the expected returns
of each asset or portfolio of assets can be expressed as a function of the amount of variance
that it contributes to the market portfolio. Formally, the expected return on asset i (E(Ri))
can be expressed as
E(Ri) = Rf + βim(E(Rm)−Rf ), (2.2)






Equation (2.2) is the traditional Sharpe-Lintner CAPM equation. The right-hand side
of the equation expresses asset i’s expected return as the sum of a risk-free rate and a
risk premium, where the risk premium is modeled as the product of CAPM beta (β) and
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expected excess market returns (βim(E(Rm)−Rf )). As the slope in equation (2.2), CAPM
beta measures the sensitivity of asset i’s returns to the variation in the excess market return.
Alternatively, CAPM beta measures the additional variance that asset i contributes to the
overall market based on its returns’ covariance with the market.
The CAPM applies to valuation because it can be used to estimate the discount rate.
For example, the CAPM estimates δ in Equation (2.1) as
δˆ = 1 + Rˆf + βˆi(Rˆm − Rˆf ). (2.4)
Following CAPM theory, Equation (2.4) models the estimated discount rate as a linear
function of a risk-free rate and a risk premium that corresponds to the valuation asset’s
return covariance with the market.
Black (1972) derives a more general version of the CAPM that does not assume the
existence of a risk-free asset. Allowing for unrestricted short-selling of risky assets, Black
(1972) shows that the market portfolio remains among the set of mean-variance efficient
portfolios. Without a risk-free asset, investors continue to choose among the mean-variance
efficient portfolios. For all market assets to clear, the market portfolio must then equal a
value-weighting of all the mean-variance efficient portfolios that are selected by investors.
Since a value-weighted portfolio of mean-variance efficient portfolios must also be mean-
variance efficient, the market portfolio must also be mean-variance efficient.
Fama and French (2004) argue that the CAPM assumptions of both the Sharpe-Lintner
model and the Black model are unrealistic. For example, they argue that it might be
unreasonable to believe that investors hold homogeneous expectations of future returns
distributions, that there is unlimited borrowing and lending at the risk-free rate, or that
investors can engage in unlimited short-selling among risky assets. Fama and French
(2004) acknowledge, however, that many theoretical models contain unrealistic assumptions
necessary to simplify the model’s analysis. As a result, the merits of a model are best
determined by empirical evidence.
Empirical tests generally focus on three CAPM model implications. One model im-
plication is that beta completely encapsulates the cross-sectional variation in expected
excess future returns. If investors hold homogeneous expectations and consider only an
investment’s expected return and variance, then no other variable should provide marginal
explanatory power for expected excess future returns.2 The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model
can be rewritten to express expected excess returns as a function of the risk premium.
2These tests also assume that investors do not systematically misprice future cash flows.
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Therefore, a second implication of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model is that an intercept
term, when included in the empirical estimate for beta, should approximate zero. The
Sharpe-Lintner model also implies that the market risk premium (E(Rm)−Rf ) is positive.
Otherwise, investors would invest in only the risk-free rate or a zero-beta asset and the
model would fail to explain investors’ observable market responses.
The literature’s early empirical tests of the CAPM largely support the version of the
model by Black (1972) but not the Sharpe-Lintner version (Black, Jensen, & Scholes, 1972;
Blume & Friend, 1973; Fama & MacBeth, 1973). They find evidence suggesting that the
market portfolio is among the set of mean-variance efficient portfolios and that returns
are significantly positively associated with beta; however, the beta and average return
association for the Sharpe-Lintner model is weaker than expected, suggesting that other
factors might also explain the cross-sectional variation in returns (Fama & French, 1992).3
The strongest evidence against the CAPM began appearing in the late 1970s with the
beginning of the anomalies literature that attempts to identify variables to explain the vari-
ation in excess returns beyond what is explained by CAPM beta. Some of the best-known
anomalies include the price-to-earnings (Basu, 1977), size (Banz, 1981; Fama & French,
1992, 1993), market-to-book (Fama & French, 1992, 1993), momentum (De Bondt & Thaler,
1985; Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993), and accrual anomalies (Sloan, 1996). The research
associated with each of these anomalies finds evidence that beta does not comprehensively
explain excess stock returns. Part of the response in the literature has been to examine
theoretical risk model alternatives to the CAPM, including multifactor models based on
arbitrage pricing theory (Ross, 1976). For example, Fama and French (1992, 1993) examine
a multifactor model based on firm characteristics believed to influence the sensitivity of
a firm’s stock returns to systematic risk. They combine beta with two factors based on
market-to-book and size and document evidence that their additional factors explain excess
stock returns both independently and when combined with a beta based on stock returns.
In contrast, the literature has also responded to evidence against the CAPM by in-
vestigating the restrictive assumptions that are imposed by empirical CAPM estimates.
These papers argue that the interpretation of the CAPM tests is made more difficult by
the inability to distinguish between a failure of the CAPM assumptions or of the empirical
3Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) re-examine the earlier evidence of the weak association between
average stock returns and beta and document a significant positive association having a more reasonable
compensation level between 6 to 9%, per year. The authors find this result after controlling for potential
survivorship and winner-loser bias and examining a longer time horizon of data.
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assumptions used to estimate the model. CAPM empirical estimates require some additional
assumptions that might significantly impede any true test of the model.
Standard empirical CAPM implementations require three inputs: expected asset returns,
expected market returns, and a risk-free asset return. The model is often estimated for
equity assets so that empirical estimates frequently use realized stock returns to proxy for
expected returns. The Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (S&P 500) is most commonly used
to proxy for the market portfolio, and the U.S. Treasury bill is most commonly used as a
proxy for the risk-free asset (Campbell et al., 1997). Using ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression, the time-series model is estimated as:
(Retit −Retft) = αi + βim(Ret500,t −Retft), (2.5)
where Retit is firm i’s realized stock return at time t, Retft is the treasury bill rate at time t,
and Ret500,t is the S&P 500 return at time t.
4 I refer to the traditional stock returns-based
empirical model presented in Equation (2.5) as the stock returns beta model. It is the
model most frequently estimated in the extant literature.
In a seminal critique of the prior empirical tests, Roll (1977) emphasizes that the market
portfolio proxy is incomplete and tests that reject the CAPM only reject the market portfolio
proxy. However, later research suggests that CAPM test inferences are largely insensitive
to the portfolio of assets chosen to proxy the market portfolio. Stambaugh (1982) examines
alternative market portfolio proxies and provides evidence that test inferences are similar
regardless of whether a stock-based, bond-based, real-estate-based, or a combination of the
three is used. Further, Kandel and Stambaugh (1987) and Shanken (1987) provide evidence
that as long as the proxy for market portfolio expected excess returns is highly correlated
with the expected excess returns of the true market portfolio, then CAPM test inferences
will not be weakened by the proxy choice.
Arguments have also arisen against the evidence in support of multifactor models,
particularly those that seem to have arisen from the anomalies literature. They argue that
the strong association between expected future returns and variables other than CAPM
beta might be due to data-snooping or sample-selection bias. Data-snooping biases refer to
statistical biases that are caused by applying the inferences obtained from one dataset
to subsequent research questions that are examined using the same dataset. Lo and
MacKinlay (1990) examine the potential magnitude of data-snooping bias in tests of the
Sharpe-Linter CAPM using analytical tests, Monte Carlo simulations, and some empirical
4According to the Sharpe-Lintner version of the model, αi should equal zero for each asset.
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analysis. They demonstrate that data-snooping bias can be significant, although they are
unable to quantify the exact extent to which data-snooping might have affected current
research conclusions regarding the CAPM. Still, they provide a warning that data-snooping
biases can substantially influence financial research.
Sample selection biases refer to inference biases that occur when research design choices
systematically exclude firms from an analysis that is intended to yield results that are gener-
alizable. For example, Kothari et al. (1995) argue that the book-to-market anomaly studies
suffer from survivorship bias. They argue that the bottom book-to-market percentiles in
the risk factor tests conducted by Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French (1993) are
underrepresented since firms having low book-to-market ratios are usually poor performing
and would be excluded from a sample that examines future returns because they would
no longer be among the set of firms having actively traded securities. Therefore, a future
returns test that examines the lowest book-to-market precentiles would be biased toward
including only those poor performing firms that are able to turn-around their operations.
Fama and French (1996) later dispute the book-to-market bias; however, sample selection
bias remains a general concern in the CAPM literature.
To examine the validity of alternative arguments for and against the CAPM, Campbell
et al. (1997) conduct a statistical analysis of returns deviations from the CAPM. They
model expected deviations based on four scenarios. In the first scenario, they assume that
the CAPM fully explains future returns. In the second scenario, they assume that the
CAPM omits a relevant risk factor, implying that a multifactor model more appropriately
models risk. In the third and fourth scenarios, they examine the possibility that the CAPM
implementation is biased or that returns cannot be modeled by traditional risk factor
analysis. In the third scenario, they examine a scenario where a nonrisk-based explanation
has only a moderate impact on return deviations. In the fourth scenario, they examine a
scenario where they have greater impact. In general, they find evidence that the failure of
beta to explain average returns is most consistent with a nonrisk-based explanation rather
than with a missing risk factor explanation.
To summarize, prior literature’s support for the CAPM is mixed. Current research
fluctuates between criticisms of the unrealistic CAPM assumptions, including the evidence
against these assumptions, and criticisms of the imprecise empirical estimates of CAPM
beta along with their related assumptions. Much of the current literature either examines
theoretical alternatives to the CAPM or improvements to the model’s potentially flawed
empirical implementation. In the next section, I review a subset of the literature that
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examines potential empirical improvements to CAPM estimates by using accounting inputs
rather than stock return or market-based inputs to estimate CAPM beta. I refer to this set
of alternative empirical estimates as accounting beta estimates.
2.2 Accounting Beta
Although standard practice estimates common risk factors using the joint realized return
distributions of past stock returns and marketwide returns (stock returns beta), it is unclear
what aspects of fundamental risk are captured by the covariance between realized stock
returns and marketwide returns. Since firm value, earnings, and risk arise from firms’ oper-
ating, financing, and investing activities, some observers advocate using the distributional
characteristics of earnings to estimate risk (Baginski & Wahlen, 2003; Nekrasov & Shroff,
2009). Prior literature in accounting and finance both support the notion that accounting
provides information that is fundamental to risk assessment. For example, Beaver, Kettler,
and Scholes (1970) examine the correlation between accounting-based risk measures and
stock returns-based measures, and Fama and French (1995) examine whether their size and
book-to-market risk factors are associated with similar factors for earnings.
Others argue that the variances and covariances of stock returns might capture market
information that is irrelevant to the average investor’s risk assessments (Cohen et al.,
2009). Specifically, accounting might better capture investors’ expectations of future excess
returns if, on average, investors adopt buy-and-hold strategies. As investors’ investment
holding periods increase, the relevant investment risk shifts from short-term nondiversifiable
investment return variance to the nondiversifiable variance in firms’ long-term earnings
performance. Similarly, Brainard, Shapiro, and Shoven (1991) argue that, if markets are
even slightly inefficient, mispricing may contaminate not only average stock returns but
also the risk measures that use them as inputs. In summary, if accounting inputs are better
proxies for the risk relevant to investors, then accounting-based risk estimates might better
predict future realized returns than stock returns-based estimates.
Prior accounting research in valuation motivates risk measures that are founded on
modern finance theory. Feltham and Ohlson (1999) advocate using risk measures that are
associated with the nondiversifiable variability inherent in expected future residual income.
In their analysis, they argue the equivalence between market value of equity and book
value of equity using assumptions of no arbitrage and clean surplus accounting. They then
demonstrate how traditional cost of capital theories in finance can be directly applied to
accounting valuations derived using the residual income model and encourage researchers
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to explore risk estimates that are founded on strong economic theory.5
Accounting betas are built on the strong financial theory of the CAPM but also represent
accounting-based estimates. While stock returns betas are CAPM estimates that use
realized stock returns to proxy for expected returns, accounting betas are CAPM estimates
that use reported accounting rates of return to proxy for expected returns. Specifically,
investors would estimate accounting betas according to the following empirical model:
(ROEit −Retft) = αi + βim(ROE500,t −Retft), (2.6)
where ROEit is firm i’s reported accounting return on equity (ROE) at time t, Retft is the
treasury bill rate at time t, and ROE500,t is the ROE estimated for the S&P 500 at time t.
In Equation 2.6, the S&P 500 portfolio of firms is used as a proxy for the market portfolio;
however, other empirical proxies might be chosen.6 From the equation, one can see that
accounting beta is the empirical accounting analog to stock returns beta (Equation (2.5))
in that it uses an accounting rate of return, ROE, instead of stock returns as a proxy for
investment returns.
Cohen et al. (2009) motivate the use of accounting inputs to estimate CAPM beta
by using the price-to-book decomposition performed by Vuolteenaho (2001, 2002) and













ρj log(1 +Rt+j). (2.7)
In Equation (2.7), MEt and BEt are lagged market equity and book equity, respectively.
Cohen et al. (2009) argue that over an infinite horizon, the unexpected realizations of
the ROE summation will equal the unexpected realizations of the stock returns summa-
tion so that infinite-horizon ROE should approximate infinite-horizon stock returns. The
5Feltham and Ohlson (1999) also emphasize that proper valuation involves discounting firm’s future
expected abnormal earnings by applying the discount directly to the numerator. In their analysis, they
demonstrate that the ad hoc risk adjustment applied by appending the risk premium directly to the discount
rate in the denominator assumes that a firm’s abnormal earnings over time and across various projects have
equivalent risk. They suggest that although this might be an acceptable approach in practice to simplify
estimation, it might not always be acceptable in theoretical work. Because my objective is to examine
the effects of conservative accounting methods on risk assessment as typically conducted by investors, my
analysis should not be affected by focusing on theories that use a simplified model that adjusts risk in the
denominator of a valuation.
6According to the Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM model, αi should equal zero for each asset.
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sums, however, might differ over a finite horizon. Alternatively, accounting beta might be
motivated from general arbitrage pricing theory (APT), which suggests that investment
risk arises from the covariance of returns with a kernel in the economy.7 Applying APT
to accounting, the covariance of a firm’s earnings with economy-wide earnings seems an
adequate substitute (Penman, 2010a).
The empirical estimation for accounting betas suffers from two potential drawbacks
compared to stock returns betas. First, accounting betas require long estimation horizons
due to less frequent accounting data. Second, the market index is somewhat ad hoc because
their is no market index ROE equivalent to a stock returns index. Also, because the
frequency of accounting data is inconsistent across firms, the market portfolio must be
constructed using the most recent lagged accounting information for each firm, which will
have staggered measurement horizons. When using annual financial accounting data to
estimate betas, the differences in the accounting measurement horizons for each firm in the
portfolio might be significant.
Because accounting information is generally backward-looking, accounting betas might
not provide as good of estimates as return betas in some contexts. In essence, stock returns
potentially have an information advantage over accounting rates of return because they are
able to incorporate expectations regarding future returns. However, because accounting
focuses on actual performance, it omits any speculation that might be driving returns
and that investors might not consider relevant to risk assessment, particularly if they face
longer holding periods. Consequently, it is an empirical question whether accounting betas
or stock returns betas best capture the economic risks underlying firms’ value-generating
processes. The measures are imperfectly correlated and thus must capture somewhat
different underlying constructs (Beaver et al., 1970). The measures might capture different
aspects of risk that are imperfectly correlated. Alternatively, they might differ in the degree
to which they reliably measure risk.
Beaver et al. (1970) are the first to investigate accounting betas. They examine the
correlations between stock returns beta and accounting beta to determine whether they
capture similar constructs. They document evidence that accounting beta is weakly associ-
ated with stock returns beta. The two measures also exhibit dissimilar time-series behavior.
Whereas portfolio stock returns betas calculated over 1947-1956 are highly correlated with
the stock returns betas from the same portfolio calculated over 1957-1965, they find very
weak correlations for portfolio accounting betas estimated over the same periods. Beaver
7APT encapsulates the CAPM.
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et al. (1970) compare the correlation between accounting beta and stock returns beta to six
other accounting measures for risk, including earnings variance, average dividend payout,
average asset growth, and average asset size. In general, they find evidence that accounting
beta appears to have a stronger positive association with stock returns beta than all other
measures except earnings variance and average dividend payout.
Baginski and Wahlen (2003) examine the association between accounting beta and the
priced risk premium implicit in stock prices. They estimate the priced risk premium as
the difference between a residual income model valuation of a firm, discounted using only
a risk-free rate, and the contemporaneous market price for the firm. They document a
significant positive association between accounting beta and the priced risk premium, but
they find that accounting beta explains little of the premium’s cross-sectional variation
compared to the amount of cross-sectional variation explained by stock returns beta or the
Fama and French (1992, 1993) risk factors.
Cohen et al. (2009) re-examine the relative explanatory power of stock returns beta
using an alternative measure of the priced risk premium that is implicit in stock prices.
Using the price-to-book decomposition by Vuolteenaho (2001, 2002), they derive a priced
risk premium measure based on the sum of discounted simple expected future returns, which
they proxy using future S&P 500 market index realized returns. In addition to examining the
explanatory power of accounting beta, they conduct a portfolio analysis of the magnitude of
the accounting beta valuation errors measured as the residuals from regressions of the priced
risk premium on accounting beta. Cohen et al. (2009) provide evidence that accounting
betas provide significant explanatory power for returns and also yield, on average, smaller
valuation errors than stock returns betas. They find that the difference is particulary acute
over longer realized return measurement horizons for the priced risk premium, such as a
5-year future realized returns window.
The stock returns-based risk premium model imposes two key assumptions. First, it
assumes that the expected rate of return is a linear function of the risk-free rate and a
constant risk premium. Second, it assumes clean surplus accounting. A strength of the
model is that it indirectly relaxes assumptions regarding investors’ choice of a valuation
model. If investors’ valuations diverge significantly from valuation models that are based
on the residual income model, then a simple stock returns-based model of priced risk might
improve the analysis of an association between risk estimates and priced risk. However,
the model also introduces potentially serious drawbacks that have yet to be examined by
the literature. Future realized returns include not only investors’ expected rates of return,
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but also investors’ revisions in expected future cash flows. If unexpected cash flow news is
insignificant or unsystematic, a returns-based model will reasonably proxy for expected rates
of return. However, if unexpected earnings news is systematic, it potentially introduces an
omitted correlated variable to the analysis if left uncontrolled. The findings of Cohen et al.
(2009), rather than providing evidence that accounting beta is a good risk estimate, might
provide evidence that accounting beta is positively associated with unexpected earnings
news, which might be associated with the accounting used to estimate the model.
Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) derive a slightly altered version of accounting beta directly
from the residual income model. Following Baginski and Wahlen (2003), they estimate an
implicit priced risk premium using a residual income valuation that they discount using
only a risk-free rate. In contrast to Baginski and Wahlen (2003), they find evidence that
accounting beta provides significant explanatory power over stock returns beta and the
Fama and French (1992, 1993) risk factors.
The recent evidence for accounting beta suggests that, on average, accounting betas are
superior to stock returns betas based on their finding that accounting beta risk measures
better estimate the risk that is implied by market prices. Moreover, they find that account-
ing betas explain the value-to-growth equity risk premium documented by prior literature,
suggesting that the premium might represent compensation for risk that is not adequately
controlled for via stock returns beta. These results suggest that accounting beta might
be a superior risk measure on average, but the extant research does not examine whether
predictable settings exist in which stock returns beta is superior to accounting beta, and
vice versa.
Accounting-based risk measures are functions of not only risk but also of the accounting
methods used to derive the accounting inputs. To the extent accounting inputs are derived
using imprecise accounting methods, accounting-based risk measures that rely on those
estimates might generate similarly imprecise risk estimates. In these settings, stock returns-
based estimates might have an information advantage if stock returns impound all value-
relevant information. Potential accounting distortions might include arbitrary accounting
methods such as straight-line depreciation or they might include intended distortions such
as earnings management. To my knowledge, research has not yet examined whether there
exist identifiable systematic distortions in accounting betas that lead to predictable settings
where stock returns betas are, on average, superior risk estimates over accounting betas.
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2.3 Summary
The CAPM’s empirical problems might reflect the model’s theoretical failings, the result
of many simplifying assumptions, or the difficulties of implementing legitimate tests of the
model. Yet, recent evidence for accounting betas provides some evidence of overcoming the
problems with stock returns beta. Despite the CAPM’s shortcomings, it remains one of
the most widely used risk measures in both research and practice (Fama & French, 2004;
Graham & Harvey, 2001). The attraction to the CAPM is due to its simple implementation
and rather intuitive theoretical interpretation. For valuation, Feltham and Ohlson (1999)
advocate using risk measures based on the nondiversifiable variability inherent in a firm’s
expected future residual income. Overall, the evidence suggests that the CAPM remains
a relevant risk estimation method for valuation. Therefore, for an examination of how
conservative accounting might distort investor’s risk assessments, an analysis of acccounting
beta also seems appropriate.
CHAPTER 3
ACCOUNTING BETA AND ACCOUNTING
CONSERVATISM
Prior literature suggests that accounting beta is an, on average, superior risk estimate
to stock returns beta, but it does not examine whether predictable settings might exist in
which a stock returns-based measure is superior to an accounting-based measure, and vice
versa. I investigate this issue. Specifically, I examine whether a characteristic of firms’
accounting policies (i.e., accounting conservatism) and economic environment (i.e., growth)
cause the relevant properties of earnings to be less effective at capturing risk. In considering
the source of measurement distortion in both accounting and stock returns betas, it may
be useful to consider the source of accounting and stock returns data in general. Since
accounting data are a function of the accounting policies of a firm, errors in the accounting
data are likely associated with firms’ accounting policies. Although financial markets use
accounting data to value firms’ equity, the markets might correct accounting data errors
during valuation. However, the process of valuation might also introduce new errors into
stock returns. As a result, the question of whether identifiable contexts exist in which one
measure is superior to the other is an empirical question.
Penman (2010a) suggests that if accounting rates of return are negatively associated
with combined accounting conservatism and past investment growth, then during broad
economic expansion, the cross-sectional differences in firms’ accounting conservatism might
cause accounting betas to underestimate a firm’s risk. The average firm’s investment growth
broadly follows economic cycles (Stock & Watson, 1999). Prior research shows that past
investment growth combines with conservative accounting to reduce a firm’s ROE (e.g.,
Greenball, 1969; Penman & Zhang, 2002; Rajan et al., 2007). If the ROE of firms having
unbiased accounting moves, on average, with the market, then, all else equal, a conservative
accounting firm’s ROE will have a diminished covariance with the ROE of a firm with
unbiased accounting. The conservative accounting firm will, on average, have a smaller
ROE during economic expansion and a larger ROE during economic contraction than the
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unbiased accounting firm. The reduced covariance would generate smaller accounting betas
for firms with more conservative accounting during periods of changing economic growth so
that firms with more conservative accounting would appear less risky even if the difference
between the firms was largely due to their accounting.
The above suggests that, in certain economic contexts, the combined effects of accounting
conservatism and past investment growth might reduce the effectiveness of accounting
betas for firms with more conservative accounting. Accordingly, I examine the impact
of accounting conservatism and past investment growth on the ability of accounting betas
to generate smaller valuation errors relative to stock returns beta.
I examine the differences between the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock
returns beta. By comparing the valuation errors of accounting beta to stock returns
beta, I indirectly control for other information included in market portfolio returns that
is uncorrelated with either accounting beta or stock returns beta. Thus, examining the
association between the differences in the residuals and both accounting conservatism and
past investment growth should provide a clearer analysis of the risk measurement differences
between accounting beta and stock returns beta. Following Cohen et al. (2009), I estimate
valuation errors as the residuals from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of discounted
simple future realized market portfolio stock returns on either accounting beta or stock
returns beta.
Examining the valuation error differences between accounting beta and stock returns
beta provides evidence of the measurement distortion in accounting betas related to ac-
counting conservatism. An examination of the differences also investigates whether one
risk measure is superior in such settings. If stock returns betas are less vulnerable to the
impact of accounting conservatism and if they are reasonable proxies for risk in their own
right, I predict that their valuation errors will be smaller than those of accounting-based
risk measures for conservative accounting firms during periods of broad economic growth
or contraction.1
In this chapter, I begin my analysis by first providing a more detailed description of my
hypotheses for accounting conservatism, investment growth, and accounting betas. I next
describe my empirical test design, including sample selection and variable measurement
choices. I then conduct the primary tests of my hypotheses. I delay sensitivity and
1Stock returns might be similarly affected by conservatism and past investment changes. Penman and
Zhang (2002) document evidence that investors fail to immediately adjust for the ROE distortion caused
by accounting conservatism and investment growth so that they incorporate the distortion into prices and
subsequent returns.
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robustness analyses until Chapters 4 and 5. I end this chapter with a brief discussion
of my primary results.
3.1 Hypothesis Development
The CAPM defines risk as the covariance between an asset’s expected returns and the
expected returns on the market, but the CAPM is typically estimated using past realized
returns to proxy for expected future returns. For example, stock returns betas are estimated
using past realized stock returns to proxy for expected future returns, while accounting betas
are estimated using past realized accounting rates of return (typically the return on common
equity (ROE)) to proxy for expected future returns.
If realized stock returns and reported ROE are reasonable proxies for expected asset
returns, then both stock returns-based and accounting-based risk estimates conform to
original CAPM theory, and either risk-estimate should adequately measure risk. This is not
likely the case, however, since both estimates are based on models that use imperfect proxies
for expected future returns. This suggests that both measures are potentially inadequate
or that the relative superiority of one measure over the other might be contextual.
For the latter situation to be descriptive, two conditions must hold. First, measurement
error in the two types of risk estimates must not be perfectly correlated. Second, it must
be possible to identify observable contexts in which one of the risk measures is expected
to be superior to the alternative. In this study, I restrict my analysis to a single source of
measurement distortion, conservative accounting, where I feel that the difference between
the two measures is likely significant and where the distortion can be reasonably estimated
by commonly used proxies.2
3.1.1 Conservatism, Growth, and Accounting
Rates of Return
I adopt the definition of conservatism provided by Gjesdal (2004). Accounting is conser-
vative if it records investments at a carrying value that yields an accounting rate of return
2Specifically, I examine unconditional accounting conservatism as motivated by the theoretical analysis
of Rajan et al. (2007). Future research might examine distortions related to conditional accounting conser-
vatism or even distortions that are introduced through management reporting discretion including earnings
management. By focusing on unconditional accounting conservatism, I limit my analysis to examining
a distortion potentially introduced by public accounting standards, specifically one based on conservative
accounting policies. Although the distortion of accounting-based risk measures due to management discretion
in earnings is perhaps less controversial, it may be more difficult to measure and predict. By limiting the scope
of my analysis to examine only conservative accounting practices that are specifically required by accounting
standards and that require little manager or auditor judgment, I provide evidence on the consequences of
conservative accounting policies on risk assessment.
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greater than the internal rate of return based on the investments’ cost. Prior literature
extensively documents the systematic association between conservative accounting and
accounting rates of return (e.g., Beaver & Ryan, 2000; Greenball, 1969; Penman & Zhang,
2002). Like the prior literature, Rajan et al. (2007) model the association and find that ac-
counting rates of return are higher (lower) than the internal rate of return on an investment
when accounting is conservative and the firm’s investment growth rate is less (greater) than
the internal rate of return.3 They extend this result to find a negative association between
accounting rates of return and the combined interaction between accounting conservatism
and past investment growth over the average useful life of a firm’s assets.
(Rajan et al., 2007) model an investment’s useful life as the relevant period for analyzing
the joint effects of accounting conservatism and investment growth on accounting rates of
return. They assume geometric investment depreciation so that each year’s depreciation
expense is equal to or less than the previous year’s depreciation expense. Both straight-line
depreciation and the immediate expensing of investments satisfy this criterion. They also
assume uniform investment cash flows and suggest that this assumption might correspond
to a setting where new investments result in fixed production capacity for a firm.
With these additional assumptions, the model of Rajan et al. (2007) predicts that
conservative accounting and past investment growth are “substitutes” in their joint impact
on accounting rates of return. Given accounting conservatism, an increase in past investment
growth reduces ROE and magnifies the effect of any further increase in investment growth on
ROE, and vice versa. Given past investment growth, an increase in accounting conservatism
reduces ROE and magnifies the effect of any futher increase in accounting conservatism
on ROE. Thus, the combination of accounting conservatism and past investment growth
is negatively associated with accounting rates of return. In empirical tests of their model,
Rajan et al. (2007) find support for the negative cross-partial interaction between accounting
rates of return and both accounting conservatism and average past investment growth. I
provide a demonstration of their model’s findings in the Appendix.
3.1.2 Conservatism, the Absolute Value of Past
Investment Growth, and Accounting Betas
Penman (2010a) suggests that accounting conservatism, when combined with investment
growth, might cause accounting betas to understate firm risk in the presence of marketwide
economic growth. The findings of Rajan et al. (2007) findings suggest that compared to a
3Liberal or aggressive accounting reverses the prediction.
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firm with unbiased accounting, the ROE of an identical firm having conservative accounting
will be smaller during periods of increasing past investment growth and larger during periods
of decreasing past investment growth. Conservative accounting diminishes the covariance
between the two firms.
For the negative covariance effect to broadly apply to the ROE covariance between a
conservative accounting firm and the market portfolio, I make two additional assumptions.
First, I assume that, on average, a firm’s investment rate tends to be procyclical with the
economy (Stock & Watson, 1999).4 Second, I assume an on average positive correlation
between firm and market performance. If the ROE of a firm that grows investments subject
to neutral accounting treatment rises and falls, on average, with the market, then the
ROE of a firm that grows investments subject to more conservative accounting treatment
might appear diminished relative to marketwide ROE due to the interactive effects between
conservative accounting and past investment growth. If firms’ accounting conservatism
varies cross-sectionally, then, during periods of varying investment growth, I predict that
firms having more conservative accounting treatment will have systematically smaller ac-
counting betas than firms having less conservative (more neutral) accounting. Specifically,
I hypothesize that:
H1: Accounting beta is negatively associated with conservative accounting and the absolute
value of past investment growth.
I hypothesize that accounting beta is negatively associated with the joint effect of con-
servative accounting and the absolute value of past investment growth. Because accounting
rates of return are negatively associated with the joint effect of accounting conservatism
and past investment growth, as investment growth increases (decreases), accounting rates
of return decrease (increase) (Rajan et al., 2007). The covariance between the ROE of a firm
having unbiased accounting treatment and the ROE of a firm having conservative accounting
treatment is diminished as the investment in both firms either grows or contracts. I therefore
predict that accounting beta is negatively associated with accounting conservatism and the
absolute value of past investment growth.
Although Cohen et al. (2009) and Nekrasov and Shroff (2009) document evidence that
4Fama and French (1997) provide suggestive evidence that many industries’ abnormal returns positively
covary with the market’s abnormal returns. They estimate beta for 59 industry portfolios and document that
beta is positive across each portfolio. Their findings might also suggest a general investment procyclicality
across major industries. Combining their findings with the findings of Stock and Watson (1999), I generally
assume broad procyclical growth among firms.
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accounting betas produce valuations with smaller valuation errors than stock returns betas,
the predicted systematic cross-sectional variation in firms’ accounting betas suggests that
firms having more conservative accounting and greater absolute past investment growth are
more likely to have greater valuation errors. It also suggests a context where stock returns
beta might be a superior risk estimate to accounting beta. I therefore predict the following:
H2: The on average difference between accounting beta valuation errors and stock returns
beta valuation errors is positively associated with accounting conservatism and the absolute
value of past investment growth.
3.2 Test Design
I test the predicted negative association between accounting beta and both conservative
accounting and the absolute value of past investment growth using the following panel
regression:
βroeit = γ0 + γ1Conservatismit + γ2|PInvestit|
+ γ3Conservatismit ∗ |PInvestit|+ γ4Riskit + ξit. (3.1)
Equation (3.1) describes accounting beta (βroeit ) as a function of the firm’s conservatism
(Conservatismit), the absolute value of its past investment growth (|PInvestit|), and risk
(Riskit). H1 predicts that accounting beta is negatively associated with the joint effect of
both conservative accounting and past investment changes (Conservatismit ∗ |PInvestit|).
Accordingly, I predict that γ3 is negative.
In Equation (3.1), I include the noninteracted terms for conservatism and past invest-
ment changes to provide a more complete econometric specification. I include a control
for risk because I predict that accounting beta is a function of both a firm’s idiosyncratic
fundamental risk and its conservative accounting policy. Omitting risk from the regression
might bias γ3 upward since I predict a positive assocation between accounting beta and stock
returns beta, as well as stock returns beta, conservative accounting, and past investment
growth.5 In the context of distortion due to accounting conservatism and past investment
changes, a good instrumental variable for risk will be uncorrelated with the accounting
distortion. I use stock returns beta (βretit ) to estimate risk in Equation (3.1). Although
5Conservatism might be correlated with risk because Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
frequently require conservative accounting treatment in situations where accounting measurement is difficult
or highly uncertain. Further, growth might be correlated with risk because by definition it leads to
performance instability and, if anticipated, it is associated with more uncertain forecasts of future firm
performance (Beaver et al., 1970; La Porta, 1996).
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stock returns beta should be correlated with the risk components of both growth and
conservatism, I do not expect it to be correlated with the accounting distortion. I predict
γ4 will be positive and significant.
My next tests examine the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock returns
beta risk measures. Following Cohen et al. (2009), I examine the valuation errors of risk
estimates using a set of measures they refer to as price-level alphas.6 Cohen et al. (2009)
motivate price-level alphas from a market-to-book decomposition by Cohen et al. (2003)













In Equation (3.2), MEt−1/BEt−1 denotes the market-to-book equity ratio and Rett+j
denotes the net expected future market returns on a firm’s stock.
Over an infinite horizon, or a finite horizon that captures the life of a firm, both
accounting ROE and market returns should equal. Although over finite horizons the
two measures might differ, any distortions eventually must reverse. Consistent with this
equivalence hypothesis, the decomposition in Equation (3.2) suggests that over an infinite
horizon, the market-to-book ratio is equal to one because the total accounting return
realizations must equal the total market return realizations. Over shorter horizons, the
discounted sum of ROE and the discounted sum of stock returns might differ along with
their separate covariations with a common risk factor. Cohen et al. (2009) contend that
the difference might be due to measurement error, or mispricing, in stock returns. I extend
their analysis to examine whether the difference is also due to measurement error in a firm’s
accounting rates of return that is related to accounting conservatism.
Cohen et al. (2009) rearrange Equation (3.2) and take the conditional expectation to
express the log-linear difference between market value and fundamental value as a function






They refer to the right-hand side as the price-level, which is equal to the discounted long-
horizon sum of expected future returns.
6In Chapter 5, I examine valuation errors estimated by regressing an implied cost of equity capital measure
on risk estimates for either accounting beta or stock returns beta.
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Assuming the price-level can be expressed as a linear function of the risk-free rate, a
constant risk premium, and a valuation error, Cohen et al. (2009) model the price-level as
Eˆ(RetNt ) = γ0 + γ1Riski,t + υi,t. (3.4)
In the equation, Eˆ(RetNt ) is the discounted N-year ahead expected market return at time
t, Riski,t is either accounting beta or stock returns beta, and υi,t is the price-level alpha
used to estimate the precision for each risk measure. In my analysis, I use the S&P 500
returns to proxy the expected market return and I follow Cohen et al. (2009) to estimate
Eˆ(RetNt ) as a discounted yearly simple compound holding period return of up to 5 years in
the future. I assume a constant discount rate equal to 2.5%.7
The risk-return model in Equation (3.4) assumes that future realized market returns are
comprised predominantly of returns related to risk. Prior literature, however, suggests that
future realized market returns also contain a significant portion of returns due to investors’
changing expectations about future cash flows (Easton & Monahan, 2005; Vuolteenaho,
2002). Thus, a simple analysis of the regression residuals might more closely correspond to
an analysis of the investors’ changing cash flow expectations rather than to an analysis of
the risk-relevance of accounting betas or stock returns betas. To overcome this potential
limitation, I examine the differences between the valuation errors for accounting beta and
stock returns beta.8
By comparing the valuation errors of accounting beta to stock returns beta, I indirectly
control for other information that is impounded into returns. To the extent that the other
information is uncorrelated with either risk measure, the information should be equally
present in the regression residuals generated from either model. The differences between
the residuals should then capture only the valuation error differences that are associated
with risk measurement differences between accounting beta and stock returns beta.
To test whether accounting conservatism provides a setting where stock returns betas are
more precise risk measures than accounting betas, I sort firm-years into two-dimensional
quintile portfolios for conservatism and past investment changes and examine the mean
7Cohen et al. (2009) proxy expected market returns using a sample average of discounted future returns
at time t. To remain consistent with the empirical market definition I use to calculate betas, I calculate
average returns from the S&P 500.
8Controlling for changing investors’ expectations is especially important if investors initially fail to fully
unwind the effects of conservatism and growth on ROE as suggested by Penman and Zhang (2002). In
that context, I would expect to observe a negative association between accounting beta regression residuals
and both conservatism and investment growth either because investors initially overestimated future ROE or
because they initially underestimated risk. Without including control variables to capture investors’ updated
expectations, I am unable to distinguish between these two possibilities.
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differences between the price-level alphas for accounting beta and stock returns beta. For
H2, I predict an increasing positive difference between price-level alphas for accounting
and stock returns betas over sorts for conservatism and average past investment changes.
Specifically, I predict a significant positive difference between the portfolio having the
highest rankings for conservatism and average past investment changes and the portfolio
having the lowest rankings for the two measures.
3.2.1 Sample Selection
My sample of firms comprises the intersection between CRSP and Compustat firm data
over the period 1980-2010. Table 3.1 summarizes my sample formation.
I collect all annual financial accounting data from Compustat, excluding financial in-
dustry firms that have SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and firms not having information
on CRSP. 9 My dataset is limited to observations having sufficient information to derive
ROE and my proxies for conservative accounting and the absolute value of past investment
growth. For ROE, I require that firms have reported values for pretax income and prior
book equity. For the conservative accounting and absolute value of past investment growth
proxies, I require that firms report positive gross property plant and equipment and positive
depreciation expense.
I also exclude from my sample firm-year observations having an insufficient time-series
of ROE and stock returns data to estimate accounting beta and stock returns beta, re-
spectively. I obtain monthly returns data from CRSP. For accounting beta, I require that
firms have sufficient data to calculate ROE for the 10 consecutive years prior to the risk
assessment date which I set at 4 months after the fiscal year-end.. For stock returns beta,
I require that each firm-year have 5 consecutive years of monthly returns data prior to
the risk assessment date. I use the constituents of the S&P 500 Index to proxy for the
market portfolios used to estimate accounting betas and stock returns betas. I obtain index
constituent data from the Compustat Index Constituents table. I use the index constituent
data to also form monthly value-weighted portfolios of stock returns and ROE.10 For excess
returns calcuations, I also collect monthly 10-year treasury bond yields from the Federal
Reserve Statistical Release historical database.
To complete the sample restrictions, I require that each firm-year observation have
sufficient data to calculate a minimum of 1-year ahead simple compound returns for the
9In untabulated analyses, I remove the SIC industry restriction and find statistically similar results.
10I do not exclude financial industry firms from the market portfolio.
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Table 3.1: Sample Formation (Sample Period 1980–2010)
Firm-Years Firms
All Compustat firm-year observations 426,309 32,837
Less firm-year observations:
Having SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 132,555 751
Without matching data on CRSP 50,397 9,084
Having insufficient data for ROE, conservatism, and growth 152,886 12,858
Having insufficient data to derive accounting beta 51,982 5,566
Having insufficient data to derive stock returns beta 3,346 319
Having less than one full year of future S&P returns 1,672 143
33,471 4,116
Notes: The table summarizes my sample selection criteria.
S&P 500 Index using the consecutive 12 months of realized stock returns data after the risk
assessment date. I use the future realized return data to estimate price-level alphas for the
beta measures. My final sample has 33,471 firm-years with 4,116 distinct firms.
3.2.2 Risk Measures
I estimate stock returns beta (βretit ) as the slope coefficient from a regression of a firm’s
excess market returns on the excess market returns of the S&P 500 Index:
(Rit −Rft) = αi + βi(Rmt −Rft) + εit. (3.5)
I estimate the regression over the 60 consecutive months prior to the risk assessment date.
For the risk-free rate, I use the de-annualized monthly reported yield from a 10-year treasury
bond.
I follow a similar approach to estimate accounting beta (βroeit ) as the slope coefficient
from a yearly regression of a firm’s excess ROE on the excess ROE from a market portfolio:
(ROEit −Rft) = αi + βi(ROEmt −Rft) + εit. (3.6)
I construct a monthly value-weighted market portfolio of ROE by calculating each month the
value-weighted average of the S&P 500 constituent firms’ most recently reported ROE.11
I estimate Equation (3.6) for each firm-year using the firm’s prior 10 consecutive yearly
11I follow common practice by using the S&P 500 index to proxy for the market portfolio (Campbell et al.,
1997). Prior research suggests that CAPM estimates are relatively insensitive to market portfolio selection
to the extent the portfolio is highly correlated with the market (Stambaugh, 1982; Kandel & Stambaugh,
1987; Shanken, 1987). I also examine a value-weighted market portfolio based on the set of firms comprising
the intersection between Compustat and CRSP firms. My results remain unchanged using the alternative
portfolio.
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observations of ROE data and market portfolio ROE that correspond to that year and
month.
I calculate ROE as operating income after depreciation, interest expense, and interest
income (Compustat data item pi) multiplied by one minus the marginal tax rate, all divided
by lagged book equity (Compustat data item ceq). Since taxes may be relevant to the
analysis, I adjust pretax income by a uniform yearly tax rate that follows those used
by Nissim and Penman (2001). I exclude any observations where lagged book equity is
nonpositive.
3.2.3 Conservatism and Growth Measures
Following Rajan et al. (2007), I measure conservatism as R&D plus advertising expenses
divided by total investments, where total investments is the sum of R&D, advertising,
and capital expenditures (Compustat data items xad, xrd, and capxv, respectively). An
advantage of this measure is that it abstracts managerial manipulation from permanent
conservative accounting policy by focusing on R&D expenditures (R&DExpit) and adver-
tising expenditures (AdvExpit) that are less subject to management’s reporting discretion.
By removing the potential for management-induced conservatism, I am able to restrict my
analysis to the effects of conservatism motivated by accounting standards without having
to consider managers’ motives and the market’s potential responses.
Following Rajan et al. (2007), the relevant past investment growth corresponds to the av-
erage useful life of a firm’s conservatively held assets. They estimate past growth by calculat-
ing the geometric average of a firm’s total investment growth over the prior years correspond-
ing to the estimated average useful life of the firm’s assets. Each period, Rajan et al. (2007)
estimate growth in total investment as [(TotalInvestmentst/TotalInvestmentst−1) − 1],
and they estimate average useful life by dividing the firm’s current gross property, plant,
and equipment (Compustat data item ppegt) by the current-year depreciation expense
(Compustat data item dpc).
For conservative accounting firms, I expect that both positive and negative percentage
changes in investment will reduce the covariance between a firm’s excess ROE and the excess
ROE on the market. I therefore calculate the absolute value of the geometric average of past
investment growth over the estimated average useful life of a firm’s assets. I refer to this
measure as the absolute value of a firm’s past investment growth at time t (|PInvestit|).
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3.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics for my key empirical proxies. As expected,
stock returns beta has a mean close to one. Accounting beta, however, does not. It
has a mean equal to 0.421. Although less than one, the mean is consistent with the
descriptive statistics of Nekrasov and Shroff (2009). Further, it might indicate that my
final sample is predominantly comprised of firms having more conservative accounting than
the average firm within the S&P 500 Index. Consistent with this, the average conservatism
among the set of S&P 500 firms is 0.172. The median also suggests accounting beta may
be negatively distorted since the data appear to be right-skewed so that the left tail of
the sample distribution shows increased frequency clustered near the mean. The sample
average for conservatism is 0.484, suggesting the sample is comprised of firms having a large
proportion of total investment in R&D and advertising. The average absolute value of past
investment growth is 13.5%.
I examine the correlations between my key empirical proxies in Table 3.3. Consistent
with prior literature, the correlations between accounting beta and stock returns beta
are quite low. Baginski and Wahlen (2003) examine year-by-year correlations between
accounting beta and stock returns beta and find that the Spearman correlations range from
0.06 to 0.11 over the period 1990 to 1998. I find similar results.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Percentiles
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 25 50 75
βroeit 0.421 2.162 -0.288 0.181 1.175
βretit 1.060 0.684 0.649 1.005 1.383
Conservatismit 0.484 0.273 0.258 0.477 0.708
|PInvestit| 0.135 0.135 0.049 0.102 0.180
Conservatismit ∗ |PInvestit| 0.052 0.102 0.006 0.032 0.076
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for my primary empirical proxies.
Accounting beta (βroeit ) is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression
of a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated excess market portfolio
ROE. Stock returns beta (βretit ) is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly
regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio stock
return. I use the S&P 500 index as a market portfolio proxy. Accounting
conservatism (Conservatismit) equals R&D plus advertising expenses divided by
total investments. The absolute value of past investment growth (|PInvestit|) is
the geometric average of past total investment growth over the estimated average
useful life of a firm’s assets, where average useful life equals current gross property,
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3 shows that stock returns beta is positively correlated and accounting beta is
negatively correlated with accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past invest-
ment growth, including the interaction between the two measures. The negative correlation
between accounting betas and accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past
investment growth is consistent with my hypotheses. The positive correlation between
stock returns betas and accounting conservatism might be consistent with the uncertainty
inherent in R&D and advertising expenditures that motivated accounting standards to
require that they be immediately expensed. Investment growth is also inherently risky,
potentially explaining the positive correlation observed between stock returns beta and the
absolute value of past investment growth.
3.3 Primary Tests and Results
Table 3.4 summarizes the results of testing for an association between accounting beta
and proxies for accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I find a significant negative association between accounting
beta and the interaction between accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past
investment growth. The association remains significant even after including stock returns
beta to control for risk. I also find a strong negative coefficient for conservatism alone, and
a strong positive coefficient for the absolute value of past investment growth.12
For the regression model that controls for risk, the interaction coefficient suggests that,
ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in the proportion of current period conservatively reported
investments (i.e., investments that are expensed immediately) relative to total investments
reduces the amount of variance that firm i contributes to market variance by approximately
0.006 plus 0.016 multiplied by the firm’s average absolute past investment growth rate.
For a firm having an average absolute past investment growth rate equal to approximately
14%, a 1% increase in the proportion of conservative investments decreases the variance
contributed to the market ROE variance by 0.009. Similarly, a 1% increase in the firm’s
average absolute past investment growth rate contributes to market portfolio ROE variance
by approximately 0.007, less 0.016, multiplied by the firm’s proportion of conservative
investment. For a firm having an average proportion of conservative investment equal to
approximately 48%, a 1% increase in the firm’s average absolute past investment growth rate
12Although this might suggest that accounting conservatism and investment growth each have independent
effects on accounting betas, the finding might also reflect my narrowly defined measure of conservatism where
the omitted components of conservatism and growth are more strongly correlated with the independent
measures.
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Table 3.4: Accounting Beta Regressions
βroeit = γ0 + γ1Conservatismit + γ2|PInvestit| + γ3Conservatismit ∗












Notes: This table presents the results of panel data regressions of
accounting beta (βroeit ) on accounting conservatism (Conservatismit),
absolute past investment growth (|PInvestit|), and stock returns beta
(βretit ). β
roe
it is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a
firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated excess market portfo-
lio ROE. βretit is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression of
a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio stock return.
I use the S&P 500 index as a market portfolio proxy. Conservatismit
equals R&D and advertising expenses divided by total investments.
|PInvestit| is the geometric average of past total investment growth
over the estimated average useful life of a firm’s assets, where average
useful life equals current gross property, plant, and equipment divided
by current depreciation expense. ** indicates significance with p < 0.01.
reduces market portfolio ROE variance by approximately 0.001. Therefore, if a firm with
average conservatism similarly has average absolute past investment growth, the net effect
on the firm’s contribution to market portfolio ROE variance is approximately -0.32, ceteris
paribus. The net effect is negative and is related to the hypothesized negative distortion
associated with a firm’s conservative accounting.
My findings for Hypothesis 1 support two possible interpretations. First, firms using
more conservative accounting policies might be less risky than firms using less conservative
accounting policies during periods of economic expansion or contraction.13 Alternatively,
13Because my proxy for conservatism is based upon two types of investments for which GAAP requires
immediate expensing, this first interpretation might seem unlikely. The required immediate expensing of
R&D and advertising expenses is motivated by the large degree of uncertainty related to the cash flows
generated by these investments. Instead of decreasing risk, GAAP suggests the proportion of immediately
expensed investments should be positively associated with risk.
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the impact of accounting conservatism on ROE during periods of economic expansion or
contraction might distort the covariance between firm ROE and market ROE, causing firms
with more conservative accounting to appear less risky when using accounting-based risk
measures. To distinguish between these alternative interpretations, I examine and compare
the valuation errors for both accounting betas and stock returns betas.
Table 3.5 presents the results of the regression estimates of valuation errors for account-
ing beta and stock returns beta. Panel A presents the regression results for estimating the
valuation errors for accounting beta and Panel B presents the results for estimating the
valuation errors for stock returns beta. As expected, the coefficients on accounting beta
and stock returns beta are consistently positive for all market return horizons. Although
the coefficient on stock returns beta appears larger for each of the return horizons greater
than 1 year, the adjusted R2 is smaller for stock returns betas for all but the 5-year return
horizon. The higher adjusted R2 for accounting beta is consistent with the conclusion from
the more recent literature that suggests that accounting betas have stronger explanatory
power for future returns (Cohen et al., 2009).
I next examine the association between accounting beta valuation errors and accounting
conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth. Rather than examine the
association directly, I examine the valuation error differences between accounting betas
and stock returns betas sorted by both accounting conservatism and the absolute value of
past investment growth. Because I do not control for investors’ cash flow revisions while
estimating the price-level alphas for accounting beta and stock returns beta, price-level
alphas likely contain returns components associated with investors’ cash flow revisions. I
focus my analysis on the expected returns component implicit in future realized returns by
differencing the valuation errors between accounting betas and stock returns betas.14 Table
3.6 presents the portfolio tests of these differences, sorted by accounting conservatism and
average past investment changes. I present only the results from regressions over the 1-year
and 5-year realized market returns horizons, but the untabulated results for regressions over
24- and 36-month horizons yield similar results.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the price-level alpha differences for accounting and stock
returns beta will be increasing in both conservatism and average past investment changes.
Table 3.6 documents a mostly consistent positive trend across portfolios of increasing
conservatism and growth, especially along the diagonal, for both the 1-year and 5-year
14In Chapter 5, I re-examine these results while attempting to control for investors’ cash flow revisions
and other returns components more directly within the valuation error estimation regressions.
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Table 3.5: Valuation Error (Price-Level Alpha) Estimation









N γ0 γ1 Adj. R
2
1 0.108** 0.003** 0.002
(102.802) (7.496)
2 0.232** 0.005** 0.002
(151.891) (7.225)
3 0.348** 0.006** 0.002
(162.753) (6.499)
5 0.557** 0.012** 0.003
(164.613) (8.169)









N γ0 γ1 Adj. R
2
1 0.109** 0.001 0.000
(55.594) (0.731)
2 0.228** 0.007** 0.000
(80.216) (2.852)
3 0.341** 0.010** 0.000
(86.005) (2.847)
5 0.512** 0.051** 0.003
(81.585) (9.568)
The table presents the estimation of the valuation errors for ac-
counting beta (Panel A) and stock returns beta (Panel B). The
valuation errors are the price-level alphas (υroeit ) estimated as the
residuals from regressions of average market portfolio N-year dis-
counted simple returns on each of the beta measures, accounting
beta (βroeit ) and stock returns beta (β
ret
it ). I use a constant dis-
count rate (1/ρ) equal to 2.5%. I use the S&P 500 Index as the
market portfolio. βroeit is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly
regression of a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated
excess market portfolio ROE. βretit is the slope coefficient from a
5-year monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the
excess market portfolio stock return. (t-values are in parentheses.
** indicates significance at p < 0.01.)
37
Table 3.6: Test of Differences in Price-Level Alphas
Panel A: 1-Year Price-Level Alpha Estimates
υroeit − υretit
|PInvestit|
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0000
(-2.43) (-2.02) (-1.69) (-4.12) (-1.66) (0.22)
2 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000
(-2.14) (-1.13) (-1.59) (-1.51) (-1.46) (0.11)
3 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001
(0.42) (-0.29) (-0.30) (-1.64) (-0.06) (-0.30)
4 0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0000
(1.66) (1.96) (2.53) (2.80) (1.34) (0.08)
5 0.0011 0.0014 0.0010 0.0012 0.0016 0.0077
(6.38) (8.25) (5.49) (5.96) (7.11) (6.95)
(5− 1) 0.0014 0.0017 0.0012 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019
(6.68) (7.93) (5.47) (7.25) (6.88) (7.43)
38
Table 3.6 – Continued. . .
Panel B: 5-Year Price-Level Alpha Estimates
υroeit − υretit
|PInvestit|
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0063 -0.0053 -0.0024 -0.0018 0.0026 0.0102
(-12.91) (-10.75) (-5.13) (-3.30) (4.22) (10.25)
2 -0.0057 -0.0040 -0.0023 -0.0013 0.0016 0.0107
(-10.80) (-8.27 ) (-4.74 ) (-2.74 ) (2.67) (11.36)
3 -0.0046 -0.0029 -0.0016 -0.0008 0.0033 0.0068
(-7.95) (-5.08) (-3.06 ) (-1.49) (5.30) (7.25)
4 -0.0033 -0.0012 -0.0002 0.0025 0.0053 0.0093
(-4.80 ) (-1.94 ) (-0.39) (4.03) (7.34) (8.70)
5 0.0039 0.0054 0.0044 0.0075 0.0103 0.0077
(4.27) (6.49) (5.18) (7.66) (10.64) (6.95)
(5− 1) 0.0102 0.0107 0.007 0.0090 0.0077 0.0166
(10.25) (11.36) (7.28) (8.70) (6.95) (15.60)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between price level alphas
for accounting beta and stock returns beta across accounting conservatism
(Conservatismit) and absolute past investment growth (|PInvestit|)quintiles.
Price level alphas are the residuals from regressions of discounted average market
returns on either accounting beta or stock returns beta. I discount average
future market returns over 1-year and 5-year holding periods using a constant
discount rate equal to 2.5%. I use the S&P 500 index as a market portfolio
proxy. Accounting beta is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression
of a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on the estimated excess market
portfolio ROE. Stock returns beta is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly
regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio stock
return. Conservatismit equals R&D and advertising expenses divided by total
investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric average of past total investment growth
over the estimated average useful life of a firm’s assets, where average useful
life equals current gross property, plant, and equipment divided by current
depreciation expense. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics
for the portfolio differences presented in the last row and last column assume
unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row and last column evaluate
the differences between the highest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio
and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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horizons. I find that the positive trend is also strongest for longer horizon future realized
return measurement periods. A formal test of the differences between the price-level
alphas in the highest portfolio for conservatism and growth and the lowest portfolio for
conservatism and growth among the 5-year horizon data yields a t-statistic of 15.60, which
is highly significant in the expected direction. The difference is close to 2% of the average
expected return, and suggests that conservative accounting policy, when combined with the
absolute value of past investment growth, is associated with the magnitude of the valuation
errors. It also suggests that stock returns betas provide a superior measure of risk over
accounting betas when firms use more conservative accounting policies during periods of
highly fluctuating economic growth.
3.4 Summary
My primary set of results is consistent with my hypotheses. The results suggest that
it is important to identify not only the potential distortions in stock returns, but also the
potential distortions in accounting rates of return. By understanding these distortions,
practitioners and researchers can better choose an appropriate risk measure. I provide
evidence that accounting policy can distort accounting risk measures. Specifically, I doc-
ument evidence that (1) accounting betas yield better risk estimates for firms using less
conservative accounting and (2) that returns betas provide a superior measure of risk over
accounting betas for firms that use more conservative accounting policies during periods of
highly fluctuating economic growth. In the next two chapters, I examine the sensitivity of
my results to alternative variable and test specifications. I also attempt to independently
examine the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock returns beta to investigate the
potential for distortion in both risk measures.
CHAPTER 4
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The main analysis largely supports the prediction that accounting conservatism and the
absolute value of past investment growth negatively bias accounting betas. In this chapter,
I examine the sensitivity of my results to alternative test specifications. I also examine
whether the results are largely driven by a small number of industries. I first examine
alternative beta specifications that use alternative definitions for the market portfolio or
alternative measurement horizons for stock returns beta to better approximate the mea-
surement horizon for accounting beta. I next briefly re-examine whether the primary tests
hold after using only pretax income in the definition for ROE. I conclude the chapter with
an industry analysis of the results.
4.1 Alternative Beta Specifications
In the primary analysis, I estimate beta as the slope coefficient from a regression of excess
firm returns on a market portfolio of excess returns where I define the market portfolio
as the value-weighted returns from the S&P 500. A value-weighted S&P 500 portfolio,
however, might not be the representative market for accounting ROE. The Standard and
Poors website suggests that the 500 companies included in the S&P 500 index are chosen
because they are “leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy, capturing
75% of coverage of U.S. equities.” The choice of companies to include in the index might
be subjective and might not be the representative market for accounting ROE. I examine
this possibility using two alternative portfolios; an equally-weighted S&P 500 portfolio and
a value-weighted portfolio calculated from a sample of firms obtained from the intersection
of CRSP and Compustat firms.
I construct market portfolios for both stock returns and accounting ROE. After forming
the market portfolios, I re-estimate stock returns beta and accounting beta and re-examine
the tests for Hypothesis 2 using the new beta estimates. Although I present only the results
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for 5-year price-level alphas, the results are similar for each price-level alpha measurement
horizon.
Table 4.1 presents the results of the valuation error portfolio tests that estimate account-
ing beta and stock returns beta using equally-weighted market portfolios comprised of the
S&P 500 constituents. The results in Table 4.1 are consistent with the main set of results.
The price-level alpha differences are positively associated with accounting conservatism and
the absolute value of past investment growth. The diagonal set of portfolios are increasingly
positive. Further, the difference between the portfolio of firms having the most conservative
accounting and the greatest absolute value of past investment growth and the portfolio of
firms having the least conservative accounting and the smallest absolute past investment
growth is positive and significant. The difference is close to 2% of the average expected
return, and suggests that conservative accounting policy, when combined with the absolute
value of past investment growth, is associated with the magnitude of the valuation errors.
I next examine the price-level alpha differences between accounting beta and stock
returns beta when each is estimated using a full sample value-weighted market portfolio
of either ROE or stock returns. For the full sample market portfolio, I use the intersection
of firms from the Compustat and CRSP databases. I use the CRSP-Compustat intersec-
tion rather than the full sample of either CRSP data or Compustat data to ensure the
comparability between the stock returns market portfolio and the ROE market portfolio.
Standard and Poor’s selects S&P 500 Index components to create a portfolio of in-
vestments that is representative of the U.S. equity market. The components of the index
are selected by a committee. Because the selection is subjective and dependent on how
the committee members gauge economic performance, the index might better coincide
with stock market performance than with performance as measured by firms’ financial
statements. As a market portfolio, the S&P 500 Index might distort accounting betas if
it is not representative of the market portfolio of ROE. Expanding the market portfolio to
encapsulate a broader, less subjective sample of firms might provide a better estimate of
the covariance between firm returns and the market portfolio returns, particularly for ROE.
In a final sample that includes all my test variables in addition to an accounting beta
calculated using a market portfolio estimated from a full sample of return on equity,
the mean accounting beta is 0.395 with a standard deviation of 2.661. Stock returns
beta calculated from the same sample has a mean of 1.081 and a standard deviation of
0.655. While expanding the market portfolio sample did not much affect stock returns beta
estimates, it had a substantial effect on accounting betas. Based on accounting beta, the
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Table 4.1: Equally-Weighted Price-Level Alpha Tests (5-Year)
υroeit − υretit
PInvestit
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0006 0.0055
(-7.30) (-6.58) (-4.97) (-4.87) (0.65) (4.97)
2 -0.0049 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0016 0.0049
(-6.79) (-4.80) (-4.15) (-2.73) (-1.70) (2.82)
3 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0013 0.0007 0.0027
(-2.39) (-2.75) (-2.10) (-1.65) (0.80) (2.17)
4 -0.0015 0.0006 0.0008 0.0023 0.0036 0.0051
(-1.56) (0.66) (1.02) (2.41) (3.14) (3.40)
5 0.0057 0.0089 0.0049 0.0064 0.0110 0.0053
(4.83) (8.39) (4.57) (4.44) (7.73) (2.86)
(5− 1) 0.0106 0.0137 0.0082 0.0106 0.0104 0.0159
(7.82) (10.65) (6.50) (6.30) (6.25) (10.11)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between price-level alphas for
accounting beta and stock returns beta across conservatism (Conservatismit)
and absolute past investment growth (|PInvestit|)quintiles. Price-level alphas
are the residuals from regressions of discounted average market returns on either
accounting beta or stock returns beta. I discount average future market returns
over a 5-year holding period using a constant discount rate equal to 2.5%. I use
the S&P 500 index as a market portfolio proxy. Accounting beta is the slope
coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess return on equity
(ROE) on the estimated excess market portfolio ROE. Stock returns beta is the
slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock return
on the excess market portfolio stock return. In this table, I use equally-weighted
market portfolios to estimate the betas. Conservatismit equals R&D and
advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric
average of past total investment growth over the estimated average useful life of
a firm’s assets, where average useful life equals current gross property, plant, and
equipment divided by current depreciation expense. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The t-statistics for the portfolio differences presented in the last
row and last column assume unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row
and last column evaluate the differences between the highest Conservatismit and
|PInvestit| portfolio and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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final sample appears predominantly comprised of firms that are, on average, less risky than
the market portfolio. However, the sample retains a wide degree of risk variation based on
accounting beta.
Table 4.2 shows the results of the price-level alpha, or valuation error, comparisons
between accounting beta and stock returns beta. The results remain consistent with the
main set of results. Price-level alpha differences are positively associated with accounting
conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth and the diagonal set of
portfolios are increasingly positive. Further, the difference between the extreme portfolios
having the most and least conservative accounting and the greatest and smallest absolute
past investment growth remains positive and significant.
Rather than the market portfolio introducing systematic beta valuation error differences,
the measurement horizon might also introduce systematic distortions. In the main tests,
stock returns beta is measured using monthly data over the prior 5 years. Accounting beta,
in contrast, is measured using annual data over the prior 10 years. To examine whether
these differences bias my results, I estimate a stock returns beta using annual returns data
over the prior 10 years.
I lengthen the measurement horizon for stock returns beta rather than shorten the
measurement horizon for accounting beta for two reasons. First, Cohen et al. (2009)
suggest that one reason accounting betas might provide superior risk estimates over stock
returns beta is because they avoid introducing short-term market inefficiencies to the returns
estimates. By lengthening the stock returns measurement horizon, I might alleviate some
of this problem. Second, specific accounting data items are not widely available in firms’
quarterly reports.
Table 4.3 presents the price-level alpha comparisons when using 10-year annual stock
returns to estimate stock returns beta. The results are again similar to the main set of
results.
4.2 Industry Analysis
The descriptive statistics for accounting beta suggest that I might be examining a sample
of firms that truly are less risky than the average firm. Alternatively, the sample might
consist of firms that are predominantly more conservative than the average sample firm.
Both situations might lead to incorrect conclusions to the extent they suggest that the
results are being driven entirely by a subset of firms. I have some assurance that my
sample contains sufficient variation in a firm’s level of conservatism because I am able to
observe significant differences among quintile sorts for accounting beta and stock returns
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Table 4.2: Price-Level Alpha Comparisons - Full Sample Market Portfolios (5-Year)
υroeit − υretit
PInvestit
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0053 -0.0042 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0041 0.0094
(-12.57) (-10.44) (-3.29) (1.58) (9.01) (15.17)
2 -0.0050 -0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0005 0.0028 0.0078
(-11.47) (-8.96) (-3.97) (-1.29) (6.23) (12.45)
3 -0.0047 -0.0026 -0.0015 0.0001 0.0007 0.0089
(-10.55) (-5.73) (-3.68) (0.28) (0.80) (13.57)
4 -0.0042 -0.0016 -0.0009 0.0017 0.0059 0.0101
(-7.72) (-3.08) (-1.87) (3.51) (11.29) (13.41)
5 0.0013 0.0014 0.0025 0.0057 0.0071 0.0059
(1.67) (1.89) (3.56) (7.54) (10.09) (15.12)
(5− 1) 0.0066 0.0056 0.0038 0.0051 0.0031 0.0125
(7.48) (6.68) (4.71) (5.89) (3.64) (15.12)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between price-level alphas for
accounting beta and stock returns beta across conservatism (Conservatismit)
and absolute past investment growth (|PInvestit|)quintiles. Price-level alphas
are the residuals from regressions of discounted future S&P 500 market returns
on either accounting beta or stock returns beta. I discount S&P 500 market
returns over a 5-year holding period using a constant discount rate equal to
2.5%. Accounting beta is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of
a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on the estimated excess market portfolio
ROE. Stock returns beta is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression
of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio stock return. In
this table, I use a market portfolio constructed from a full sample intersection of
firms in the CRSP and Compustat databases. Conservatismit equals R&D and
advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric
average of past total investment growth over the estimated average useful life of
a firm’s assets, where average useful life equals current gross property, plant, and
equipment divided by current depreciation expense. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The t-statistics for the portfolio differences presented in the last
row and last column assume unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row
and last column evaluate the differences between the highest Conservatismit and
|PInvestit| portfolio and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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Table 4.3: Five-Year Price-Level Alpha Comparisons using an Annual Stock Returns Beta
υroeit − υretit
|PInvestit|
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0144 -0.0091 -0.0023 0.0029 0.0081 0.0102
(-9.06) (-5.97) (-1.44) (1.59) (3.79) (10.25)
2 -0.0099 -0.0091 -0.0069 -0.0043 0.0036 0.0107
(-6.49) (-5.92) (-4.20) (-2.53) (1.15) (11.36)
3 -0.0095 -0.0026 -0.0075 -0.0012 0.0126 0.0035
(-3.95) (-0.87) (-5.04) (-0.74) (5.12) (7.25)
4 -0.0035 -0.0051 0.0000 0.0047 0.0139 0.0093
(-1.40) (-2.59) (-0.02) (2.53) (5.25) (8.70)
5 0.0040 0.0051 0.0044 0.0144 0.0146 0.0077
(1.40) (1.98) (1.75) (4.58) (4.63) (6.95)
(5− 1) 0.0183 0.0141 0.0066 0.0115 0.0066 0.0290
(5.66) (4.75) (2.25) (3.16) (1.73) (8.21)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between price-level alphas for
accounting beta and stock returns beta across conservatism (Conservatismit)
and absolute past investment growth (|PInvestit|)quintiles. Price-level alphas
are the residuals from regressions of discounted average market returns on either
accounting beta or stock returns beta. I discount average future market returns
over a 5-year holding period using a constant discount rate equal to 2.5%. I use
the S&P 500 index as a market portfolio proxy. Accounting beta is the slope
coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess return on equity
(ROE) on the estimated excess market portfolio ROE. Stock returns beta is the
slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess stock return
on the excess market portfolio stock return. Conservatismit equals R&D and
advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric
average of past total investment growth over the estimated average useful life of
a firm’s assets, where average useful life equals current gross property, plant, and
equipment divided by current depreciation expense. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The t-statistics for the portfolio differences presented in the last
row and last column assume unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row
and last column evaluate the differences between the highest Conservatismit and
|PInvestit| portfolio and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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beta valuation error differences. However, to provide additional reassurance that the dataset
is not limited to two or three unique sets of firms, I next conduct an industry analysis of
my portfolio tests.
I restrict the industry analysis to the diagonal set of portfolios in my tests since the
diagonal portfolios summarize well the overall results. In the analysis, I identify industries
using the first-digit of the firm’s SIC code obtained from Compustat. I omit SIC codes
6000-6999 because they are not included in my final sample. When SIC codes are missing
from a firm-year observation in Compustat, I backfill future SIC code data for the firm to
determine its SIC. When no data is available, I classify the firm’s industry as Unknown.
Table 4.4 presents the results of my analysis.
In Panel A of Table 4.4, I examine the relative proportion of each industry within each
diagonal quintile portfolio sorted by accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past
investment growth. Although the sample is dominated by industries having a first-digit SIC
of 2 or 3, I find that industry representation within each portfolio is not restricted to a single
industry in any of the portfolios. First-digit SIC industry 2 can be broadly characterized
as the consumer goods industry, including food and textiles. First-digit SIC industry 3
can be broadly characterized as construction and machinery, including automobiles and
airplanes. For the majority of portfolios, industry representation appears consistent across
each portfolio. The exceptions are first-digit SIC industries 1, 4, and 7. Industries 1 and 4
tend to cluster in the first portfolio pair, and industy 7 tends to cluster in the fifth portfolio
pair.
The first portfolio pair consists of firms having the least conservative accounting and
smallest absolute value of past investment growth. Industries classified with a first-digit
SIC equal to 1 are characterized by the oil and mining industries. These industries tend
to capitalize their assets and their depletion schedules are governed by some of the most
sophisticated accounting. The classification of these firms predominantly within the first
and second quintile pairs seems appropriate given that I would expect their accounting to
be among the least conservative.
Industries classified with a first-digit SIC equal to 4 are characterized by the trans-
portation and utilities industries. Both are highly regulated and likely have asset values
that closely correspond to their true values. Transportation industries tend to have large
quantities of depreciable assets and their depreciation schedules might highly correspond






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Industries classified with a first-digit SIC equal to 7 can be broadly characterized as
service industries. For service industries, the proportion of capitalized expenditures to
those that are immediately expensed is likely small. The relatively large proportion of
service industry firms in the fifth quintile pairs is therefore not unexpected.
Firms are classified into a portfolio not only by their conservatism ranking, but also their
growth rankings. To help distinguish between these two contributing factors, I examine the
average conservatism within each portfolio across different industries in Panels B and C.
Consistent with first-digit SIC industries 1 and 4 consisting predominantly of less conser-
vative firms, Panel B shows that these two industries have the lowest average conservatism
for the sample. Similarly, firms having a first-digit SIC of 7 appear to have a higher mean
conservatism.
Overall, the results suggest that the valuation error portfolio tests are not dominated by
one particular industry in any of the portfolios. They are, however, consistent with increas-
ing (but not dominating) proportions of certain industries within the extreme portfolios.
4.3 Pretax Analysis
In the main analysis, I adjust pretax income for the marginal tax rate to calculate
ROE. The adjustment is consistent with previous research by Penman and Zhang (2002),
but it might affect only accounting beta, especially if the market considers only pretax
income. However, because I make the adjustment to both firm-level ROE and market
portfolio ROE, the covariances should eliminate the effect of the adjustment on accounting
beta. I investigate this by re-examining a test that calculates ROE, and accounting beta,
using pretax income. Table 4.5 presents the results of the accounting beta regressions on
accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth.
The coefficient on the interaction between accounting conservatism and the absolute
value of past investment growth remains negative and significant. For the regression
model that controls for risk, the interaction coefficient suggests that, for a firm having
an average absolute past investment growth equal to approximately 14%, a 1% increase
in the proportion of current period conservatively reported investments (i.e. investments
immediately expensed) relative to total investments reduces the amount of variance that
firm i contributes to market variance by approximately 0.01, ceteris paribus. Similarly, for
a firm having an average proportion of conservatve investment equal to approximate 48%, a
1% increase in the firm’s average absolute past investment growth rate reduces the amount
of variance that firm i contributes to market market variance by approximately 0.003. In
untabulated results, I also find that the valuation error differences between accounting beta
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Table 4.5: Accounting Beta Analysis Using Pretax Income
βroeit = γ0 + γ1Conservatismit + γ2|PInvestit| + γ3Conservatismit ∗












Notes: This table presents the results of panel data regressions of
accounting beta (βroeit ) on conservatism (Conservatismit), absolute past
investment growth (|PInvestit|), and stock returns beta (βretit ) over a
sample of 31,997 firm-year observations from 1980 to 2009 (t-values
in parentheses). I estimate accounting beta as the slope coefficient
from yearly regressions of a firm’s excess return-on-equity (ROE) on the
excess ROE of a market portfolio composed of the S&P 500 constituent
firms. I calculate ROE as pretax income divided by lagged book equity.
I estimate stock returns beta as the slope coefficient from a monthly
regression of a firm’s excess returns on the excess market return from
the market portfolio of S&P 500 firms. I estimate conservatism as the
sum of R&D and advertising expenses divided by total investments,
where total investments is the sum of R&D, advertising, and capital
expenditures. I measure past investment change as the absolute value
of the geometric average of past investment growth calculated over
the average useful life of a firm’s assets. Useful life equals a firm’s
gross property, plant, and equipment divided by the firm’s current-year
depreciation expenses. * and ** indicate significance with p < .05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
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and stock returns beta are increasingly positive across quintile portfolios for accounting
conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth, consistent with the main
test results.
4.4 Summary
I examine the sensitivity of my results to alternative test specifications, including alter-
native definitions of the market portfolio and alternative measurement horizons for stock
returns beta that more closely match the measurement horizon for accounting beta. I also
examine the industry composition of my conservative accounting and absolute investment
growth portfolios. Each of these analyses yields results that are similar to the results in my
primary analysis, suggesting that the results are robust to alternative beta measurement
specifications and to industry composition.
This chapter examined whether my results are sensitive to how betas are measured or
how accounting conservatism and investment growth are associated with specific industries.




In my primary analysis, I follow prior literature to assess the ability of stock returns beta
and accounting beta to capture the economic risks that underlie firms’ value-generating pro-
cesses by comparing the measures’ valuation errors. I estimate the risk measures’ valuation
errors by separately regressing future realized market portfolio returns on each risk measure.
This approach is similar to other studies that assess cost of equity measures via their
association with firm-specific future realized stock returns (e.g., Easton & Monahan, 2005).
A limitation to using firm-specific realized returns to proxy for expected returns is that
realized returns also incorporate investors’ revisions to their future cash flow expectations.
Vuolteenaho (2002) suggests that investors’ cash flow revisions are a significant component
of firm-specific realized returns. Therefore, if cash flow news is left uncontrolled for while
estimating valuation errors from future realized returns, the valuation errors might include a
significant component related to cash flows news. Rather than firm-specific realized returns,
I follow Cohen et al. (2009) to estimate valuation errors using market portfolio returns.
Market portfolio returns might mitigate problems associated with investors’ firm-specific
cash flow revisions, but they might still contain a component of aggregate cash flow news.
They also potentially sacrifice firm-specific information that is crucial to assessing the
accounting beta distortion that is associated with conservative accounting and the absolute
value of past investment growth.
In my primary tests, I attempt to control for residual cash flow news in aggregate
market portfolio returns by examining the differences between the valuation errors for
accounting beta and the valuation errors for stock returns beta. To the extent accounting
betas and stock returns betas are uncorrelated with cash flow news, the differences between
the valuation errors should indirectly control for cash flow news by differencing out the
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common cash flow news component among the two sets of errors.1 Differencing the valuation
errors between the two models, however, assumes a benchmark model as a comparison. In
addition, using aggregate market portfolio information also fails to capture firm-specific
valuation error information that might be critical to the analysis. A preferable approach
would be to directly analyze the association between accounting beta valuation errors (or
stock returns beta valuation errors) and both accounting conservatism and the absolute
value of past investment growth using firm-specific rate of return information. However,
without adequate controls for cash flow news or discount rate news that are left unexplained
by the CAPM, an interpretation of the results of a direct test might prove difficult.
In this chapter, I explore direct tests of the accounting beta distortion and also an
alternative firm-specific valuation error estimate. For the direct tests of the accounting
beta distortion that is associated with accounting conservatism, I examine the following
hypothesis:
H3: Accounting beta valuation errors are positively associated with accounting conser-
vatism and the absolute value of past investment growth.
I also examine a similar hypothesis for stock returns beta. Penman and Zhang (2002)
document evidence that investors fail to immediately fully adjust for the ROE distortion
associated with accounting conservatism and past investment growth so that the distortion
is partially incorporated into current equity prices and subsequent equity returns. My
predictions regarding the relative risk precision of accounting beta and stock returns beta
rely on the assumption that the market makes at least partial significant corrections to the
bias in ROE so that the valuation errors associated with conservative accounting and past
investment growth will be, on average, smaller for stock returns beta than for accounting
beta. By independently examining the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock
returns beta, my objective is to provide evidence of the significance of the accounting
distortion to accounting beta and potentially to stock returns beta.
1In untabulated analysis, I examine valuation error tests that attempt to control for potential cash
flow news in realized market portfolio returns. As cash flow news controls, I use the difference between
firm-specific realized 1-year ahead earnings per share and forecasted earnings per share, and the difference
between 1-year ahead and current forecasts of long-term growth. I find evidence that the cash flow news
proxies do not adequately control for the information present in future realized returns. However, differencing
the valuation errors between accounting beta and stock returns beta again appears to adequately control
for the additional information. Further analysis in this chapter further supports the merits of differencing
to control for cash flow and risk factors not fully explained by either stock returns or accounting beta.
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5.1 Measuring Valuation Errors using a
Firm-Specific Implied Cost of
Equity Capital Measure
I use an implied cost of equity capital measure as a firm-specific alternative to using
value-weighted market returns to estimate the valuation errors for stock returns beta and
accounting beta. Implied cost of equity capital measures are rate of return estimates
motivated by specific valuation models along with corresponding assumptions. For example,
several implied cost of equity capital measures derive from finite-period dividend discount
models. Implied cost of equity capital measures invert the valuation model, the dividend
discount model for example, to express the discount rate as a function of the sum of future
dividends divided by price. Implied cost of equity models vary by valuation approach and by
the terminal value and discount rate assumptions applied to simplify the inverted discount
rate expression.
A notable feature of implied cost of equity rate of return estimates relative to real-
ized return-based rate or return estimates is that implied cost of equity capital estimates
frequently avoid using future realized returns inputs that also contain investors’ forecast
revisions. Implied cost of equity capital estimates generally limit the estimation inputs
to contemporaneous forecast and equity price information. Therefore, they might be less
directly correlated with the cash flow news portion of future realized returns that arise from
investors’ forecast revisions.
I use an implied cost of equity capital measure to estimate valuation errors by using the
measure as a proxy for the risk that is implicit in equity prices. Therefore, I regress the
implied cost of equity capital measure on each beta risk estimate and again use the residuals
as the valuation error estimates for each risk measure. I estimate implied cost of equity
capital using the price-earnings ratio relative to growth model (rpeg). The recent literature
that compares the validity of alternative implied cost of equity capital measures generally
concludes that rpeg demonstrates superior empirical validity relative to many of the other
measures (Botosan & Plumlee, 2005; Botosan, Plumlee, & Wen, 2011).2 I estimate rpeg as
rpeg =
√
(feps3 − feps2)/prc, (5.1)
where feps2 and feps3 are the 2-year and 3-year ahead analyst consensus earnings-per-share
forecasts, and prc is the equity price for the firm. All of the variables are measured as of the
2If rpeg or other implied cost of equity capital measures based on accounting valuation models provide
superior risk estimates, one might question why I examine accounting beta. Because the objective in implied
cost of equity capital measures is to estimate the risk implicit in equity prices, the use of such measures for
valuation that attempts to derive price is questionable.
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risk assessment date, which is 4 months after the firm’s last fiscal-year end. I obtain 2-year
ahead analyst consensus earnings-per-share forecast data directly from I/B/E/S, whereas
I approximate analyst consensus 3-year ahead earnings-per-share forecasts using I/B/E/S
2-year ahead analyst consensus forecasts along with the analyst consensus long-term growth
forecast (Ltg Forecast). Specifically, I approximate the 3-year ahead earnings-per-share
forecast as the product of the 2-year ahead analyst consensus earnings-per-share forecast
and one plus the analyst consensus long-term growth forecast.
Using rpeg, I estimate the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock returns beta
as the residuals from regressions of the form
(rpeg,it − rft) = γ0 + γ1βit + γ2ln (mveit) + γ3mbit + υit, (5.2)
where rft is an estimate of the contemporaneous risk-free rate, ln (mveit) is the natural log
of the firm i’s period t market value of equity, and mbit is firm i’s period t market-to-book
equity. Subtracting the risk-free rate from the implied cost of equity capital in Equation
(5.2) permits the dependent variable to estimate only the expected risk premium implicit in
current period prices. To proxy the risk-free rate, I use the de-annualized monthly reported
yield from a 10-year treasury bond. I include the natural log of market value of equity
and also market-to-book equity to control for additional components of risk potentially left
unexplained by either accounting beta or stock returns beta.
Berk (1995) suggests that firm size, or the log of the market value of equity, implicitly
captures the discount rate applied to expected cash flows. If two firms have identical
expected cash flows, the firm having the cash flows that the market considers riskier will have
a lower market value of equity due to the discount included in market price. Further, Berk
(1995) provides evidence that if an asset-pricing model leaves some part of risk unexplained,
or if the impirical test of the theoretical model is misspecified, then market value of equity
should correlate with the part of the risk that is left unexplained by the model.
Prior literature also suggests that expected future growth might be an additional risk
factor to CAPM beta (e.g., Botosan et al., 2011; Fama & French, 1995). Fama and
French (1995) suggest that market-to-book equity implicitly captures investors’ growth
expectations that might represent a separate risk premium that is not fully captured by
stock returns beta. To avoid confusing the growth risk premium with the conservatism
and growth distortion in accounting beta, I control for investors’ growth expectations while
estimating the valuation errors.
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics for rpeg,it and the other risk measures. rpeg,it
estimates the mean expected rate of return implied by equity prices at approximately 10%.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for Alternative Risk Measures and Controls
Percentiles
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25 50 75
rpeg,it 0.101 0.033 0.081 0.096 0.115
rft 0.066 0.027 0.044 0.058 0.082
mbit 2.849 2.902 1.394 2.098 3.285
ln (mveit) 6.898 1.939 5.461 6.769 8.146
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for the price-to-earnings
growth implied cost of equity capital measure, rpeg,it, along with the
risk-free rate (rft), firms’ market-to-book equity (mbit), and the natural
log of firms’ market value of equity (ln (mveit)). rpeg equals the square
root of the difference between 3-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead analyst
consensus earnings-per-share forecasts, scaled by current market price.
rft equals the de-annualized monthly reported yield from a 10-year
treasury bond. ln (mve) is the natural log of the market value of equity
obtain by multiplying shares ourstanding by current equity price. mbit
equals market value of equity divided by book value of equity. The
descriptives are for a sample of 17,994 firm-year observations spanning
1981 through 2010.
The average monthly reported yield on a 10-year treasury bond is near 7%. The mean
market-to-book ratio suggests that expected growth for the average firm is close to three
times book value. Similar to prior research, the mean natural log of market value of equity
is approximately 6.9.
After merging my sample with the I/B/E/S data, the number of firm-year observations
having a complete set of data is reduced to 17,994. To assess whether the reduced number
of observations provides findings that differ from my main set of results, I re-examine an
OLS regression of accounting beta on accounting conservatism and the absolute value of
past investment growth. I present these results in Table 5.2.
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the association between accounting beta and the inter-
action between accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth
remains negative and significant even after controlling for risk using stock returns beta.
However, the coefficient on the interaction term appears diminished for the smaller sample.
For the regression model that controls for risk, the interaction coefficient suggests that,
ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in the proportion of current period conservatively reported
investments (i.e., investments immediately expensed) relative to total investments reduces
the amount of variance that firm i contributes to market variance by approximately 0.003
plus 0.009 multiplied by the firm’s average absolute past investment growth rate. For a firm
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Table 5.2: Accounting Beta Analysis (rpeg Sample)
βroeit = γ0 + γ1Conservatismit + γ2|PInvestit| + γ3Conservatismit ∗












Notes: This table presents the results of OLS panel data regressions of
accounting beta (βroeit ) on accounting conservatism (Conservatismit),
the absolute value of past investment growth (|PInvestit|), and stock
returns beta (βretit ). β
roe
it is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly
regression of a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated
excess market portfolio ROE. βretit is the slope coefficient from a 5-year
monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market
portfolio stock return. I use the S&P 500 index to proxy for the market
portfolio. Conservatismit equals the sum of R&D and advertising
expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric
average of past total investment growth over the estimated average
useful life of a firm’s assets. * and ** indicate significance at p < 0.05
and p < 0.01,respectively.
having an average absolute past investment growth rate equal to approximately 14%, a 1%
increase in the proportion of conservative investments decreases the variance contributed to
the market ROE variance by 0.005. Similarly, a 1% increase in the firm’s average absolute
past investment growth rate contributes to market portfolio ROE variance by approximately
0.006 less 0.009 multiplied by the firm’s proportion of conservative investment. For a firm
having an average proportion of conservative investment equal to approximately 48%, a
1% increase in the firm’s average absolute past investment growth rate adds approximately
0.002 to the market portfolio ROE variance. If a firm with average conservatism similarly
has average absolute past investment growth, the net effect on the firm’s contribution to
market portfolio ROE variance is approximately -0.003, ceteris paribus. The net effect
is negative and is related to the hypothesized negative distortion associated with a firm’s
conservative accounting.
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I next examine the firm-specific valuation errors associated with the accounting con-
servatism and absolute past investment growth distortion. Table 5.3 presents the results
of estimating the valuation errors for both accounting beta and stock returns beta, with
and without controlling for firm growth and firm size. As expected, the coefficient on
stock returns beta is positive and significant. However, the coefficient on accounting beta
is negative and significant. Both the accounting beta and stock returns beta coefficients
remain largely unchanged after including controls for firm growth and firm size. In general,
the negative coefficient on accounting beta suggests that a ceteris paribus unit increase in
the covariance between firm ROE and marketwide ROE is associated with a 0.1% decline
in the firm’s implied rate of return. In contrast, a ceteris paribus unit increase in the
covariance between firm stock returns and marketwide stock returns is associated with a
Table 5.3: Firm-Specific Valuation Error Estimation
(rpeg,it − rfit) = γ0 + γ1βi,t + γ2ln (mveit) + γ3mbit + υit
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 Adj. R
2
βroeit 0.0358** -0.0013** 0.0063
(131.65) (-10.76)
0.0451** 0-.0014** -0.0015** 0.0004** 0.0122
(45.92) (-11.34) (-10.40) (3.89)
βretit 0.0305** 0.0041** 0.0046
(53.87) (9.19)
0.0391** 0.0039** -0.0013** 0.0003** 0.0092
(34.48) (8.62) (-9.22) (3.50)
Notes: The table presents the coefficient estimates from OLS regressions
of a price-to-earnings growth implied cost of equity capital estimate
(rpeg) in excess of the risk-free rate (rft) on each beta risk estimate,
while controlling for size (ln (mveit)) and expected future growth (mbit).
rpeg equals the square root of the difference between 3-year-ahead and
2-year-ahead earnings forecasts, scaled by current price. rft equals the
de-annualized monthly reported yield from a 10-year treasury bond.
ln (mve) is the natural log of the market value of equity obtain by
multiplying shares outstanding by current equity price. mbit equals
market value of equity divided by book value of equity. Accounting beta
(βroeit ) is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s
excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated excess market portfolio ROE.
Stock returns beta (βretit ) is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly
regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio
stock return. t-values are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at
p < 0.01.
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0.4% increase in the firm’s implied rate of return.
The negative coefficient on accounting beta might indicate that the conservative ac-
counting and absolute past investment growth distortion is biasing the association between
accounting beta and rpeg. Prior literature documents evidence that rpeg is strongly corre-
lated with growth (e.g., Botosan et al., 2011). If rpeg is correlated to the growth component
of the negative accounting beta distortion, as accounting beta increases, or as the distortion
is reduced due to a reduction in past investment growth, the increase might be associated
with a smaller rpeg due to the reduction in growth. Alternatively, the negative coefficient on
accounting beta might indicate that an additional risk factor that is negatively correlated
with rpeg and positively associated with accounting beta, or vice versa, remains uncontrolled
for within the regression model. By examining the valuation errors and some additional
tests, I hope to better distinguish between these two possibilities.
In each of the regressions, both of the control variables are significant in the expected
direction. They are also of similar magnitudes in each regression. The coefficients on the
natural log of the market value of equity suggest that a 1% increase in a firm’s market value
of equity is associated with a 0.001% decrease in the firm’s implied rate of return, which
is consistent with investors’ perceiving smaller firms as having more risk. The coefficients
on the market-to-book ratio suggest that a unit increase in the ratio is associated with a
0.04% increase in the firm’s implied rate of return, consistent with the interpretation that
investors’ perceive greater growth potential and greater risk in firms having market values
that exceed their book values.
I next test Hypothesis 3 by independently examining the valuation errors for accounting
beta and stock returns beta. Specifically, I examine the association between the valuation er-
rors and both accounting conservatism and past investment growth to directly test whether
accounting conservatism biases the valuation performance of accounting betas. Table 5.4
presents the results.
As hypothesized, the association between the beta valuation errors and accounting
conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth is significant and positive.
Both the coefficient for the accounting beta and stock returns beta are of similar magnitudes.
Likewise, the seperate coefficients for conservatism and the absolute value of past investment
growth are significant and positive, and they have similar coefficient magnitudes. The
coefficients suggest that for a firm having an average proportion of conservative investments
equal to 48%, a 1% increase in the firm’s average absolute past investment growth, ceteris
paribus, is associated with a downward bias in accounting beta such that accounting beta
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Table 5.4: rpeg Valuation Error Tests











Conservatismi,t ∗ |PInvesti,t| 0.012† 0.015*
(1.68) (2.09)
Adj.R2 0.010 0.003
Notes: This table presents the results of panel data regressions of
valuation errors for accounting beta (βroeit ) or stock returns beta (β
ret
it )
on accounting conservatism (Conservatismit ) and the absolute value
of past investment growth (PInvestit). The valuation errors are the
residuals (υit) from regressions of implied cost of equity capital using
a PEG ratio (rpeg) on each beta risk measure, controlling for size and
growth. Accounting beta (βroeit ) is the slope coefficient from a 10-year
yearly regression of a firm’s excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated
excess market portfolio ROE. Stock returns beta (βretit ) is the slope
coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock
return on the excess market portfolio stock return. Conservatismit
equals R&D and advertising expenses divided by total investments.
|PInvestit| is the geometric average of past total investment growth
over the estimated average useful life of a firm’s assets. t-values are in
parentheses. †, *, and ** denote significance at p < 0.10, p < 0.05, and
p < 0.01, respectively.
underestimates the implied cost of equity capital by approximately 0.02%. Similarly, for a
firm having an average absolute past investment growth rate equal to 14%, a 1% increase
in the firm’s proportion of conservative investments, ceteris paribus, is associated with a
downward biase in accounting beta such that accounting beta underestimates the implied
cost of equity capital by approximately 0.01%. For a firm having average conservatism
and an average absolute value of past investment growth, the model estimates suggest that
accounting beta underestimates the implied cost of equity capital by approximately 0.6%.
The results in Table 5.4 suggest that both accounting beta and stock returns beta
valuation errors are associated with the joint effects of conservative accounting and the
absolute value of past investment growth. However, I am unable to distinguish the relative
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magnitude of the bias in each of the beta risk measures. Further, when combining these
results with the parameter estimates for accounting beta and stock returns beta in the
valuation error regression model appearing in Table 5.3, it is unclear whether there still
remains additional risk factors left unexplained by the valuation error regression model.
In the valuation error regression model, the coefficient corresponding to accounting beta is
negative while the coefficient for stock returns beta is positive. Yet, the assocation between
the valuation errors and accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment
growth appears to be similar in magnitude for both accounting beta and stock returns
beta. To control for any risk that remains unexplained in the valuation error model, I again
examine the valuation error differences between accounting beta and stock returns beta.
Table 5.5 presents the results.
Consistent with the main set of results, the valuation error differences for accounting
beta and stock returns beta are increasingly positive for portfolios of firms having more
conservative accounting and greater absolute values of past investment growth. The dif-
ference between the valuation error differences for the portfolio of firms having the highest
proportion of conservative investment and highest absolute value of average past investment
growth and the portfolio of firms having the lowest proportion of conservative investment
and lowest absolute past investment growth is approximately a rate of return equal to 0.1%.
The results suggests that the market might partially correct for the ROE distortion in stock
prices and returns. The results also suggest that the firm-specific implied rate of return
estimate along with controls for size and growth might be insufficient to eliminate cash flow
news or other unexplained risk factors in the valuation error regressions. Alternatively, prior
research suggests cross-sectional correlation in the regression residuals of asset pricing tests
might distort the models’ implications. In the next section, I examine this possibility using
a common approach to correct for the potential cross-sectional correlation in the residuals:
Fama-MacBeth adjusted coefficients and t-statistics (Fama & MacBeth, 1973).
5.2 Valuation Error Analysis with Fama-
MacBeth Adjustment
A common problem with panel data regressions is cross-sectional correlation among
the residuals. Cross-sectional correlation leads to biased standard errors and t-statistics
that might also lead to incorrect inferences of a regression model’s parameters. In CAPM
analysis, cross-sectional correlation in the residuals might occur when a panel regression
model fails to explain a common rate of return component.
A traditional approach to correcting for potential cross-sectional correlation in asset
62
Table 5.5: rpeg Valuation Error Differences
υroeit − υretit
|PInvestit|
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0005 0.0010
(-4.54) (-2.28) (-2.66) (0.52) (3.68) (5.69)
2 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0007
(-4.98) (-4.64) (-1.78) (-1.88) (0.55) (3.43)
3 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0009
(-5.59) (-2.43) (-1.77) (-0.88) (1.42) (4.10)
4 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 0.0007 0.0011
(-2.99) (-0.58) (-2.14) (-0.98) (3.86) (4.88)
5 0.0000 0.0008 0.0004 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008
(-0.26) (4.49) (2.51) (4.97) (4.15) (3.32)
(5− 1) 0.0004 0.0010 0.0007 0.0008 0.0003 0.0013
(2.22) (5.00) (3.56) (3.65) (1.24) (5.83)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between valuation errors for
accounting beta and stock returns beta across quintiles for accounting con-
servatism (Conservatismit) and the absolute value of past investment growth
(|PInvestit|). Valuation errors are estimated as the residuals (υit) from OLS
regressions of excess implied cost of equity capital estimated using a PEG ratio
(rpeg) on either accounting beta or stock return beta, including controls for size
and growth. rpeg equals the square root of the difference between 3-year ahead
and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts, scaled by current price. I calculate rpeg in
excess of the risk free rate, which I estimate using the de-annualized monthly
reported yield from a 10-year treasury bond. Accounting beta is the slope
coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess return on equity
(ROE) on the estimated excess market portfolio ROE. Stock returns beta is the
slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock return
on the excess market portfolio stock return. Conservatismit equals R&D and
advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit| is the geometric
average of past total investment growth over the estimated average useful life
of a firm’s assets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics
for the portfolio differences presented in the last row and last column assume
unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row and last column evaluate
the differences between the highest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio
and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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pricing tests is to use Fama-MacBeth adjusted t-statistics and parameter estimates (Fama
& MacBeth, 1973). Fama-MacBeth t-statistics have the advantage of not only controlling
for cross-sectional correlation in the residuals but also of allowing the regression parameters
to vary over time. In the next set of tests, I estimate the valuation error regressions using
Fama-MacBeth regressions estimated annually by calendar year. For the valuation error
proxies, I collect the residuals from the annual regressions, allowing the residuals to reflect
time period differences in firms’ level of accounting conservatism and absolute value of
past investment growth. If accounting betas and stock returns betas vary significantly over
time, comparing the residuals from annual estimates might provide a more appropriate
comparison of the valuation errors for each risk estimate. Further, Fama-MacBeth adjusted
t-statistics might improve the empirical validity of the t-statistics used in the analysis.
Table 5.6 provides the results of re-estimating the valuation errors using Fama-MacBeth
regressions and rpeg as the implied rate of return estimate. The average annual coefficient
on stock returns beta is positive and significant, but the coefficient on accounting beta is
insignificant. The change in the accounting beta coefficient suggests that size and growth
might not adequately control for unexplained risk factors. With Fama-MacBeth adjustment,
only the size control is negative and significant.
I next examine whether the positive association between the valuation errors and both
accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth. Table 5.7
displays the results of tests of this association, after Fama-MacBeth adjustment. Neither the
accounting beta valuation errors nor the stock returns beta valuation errors are significantly
associated with the interaction between accounting conservatism and the absolute value of
past investment growth. Therefore, after Fama-MacBeth adjustment, it is no longer clear
whether the valuation errors for accounting beta or stock returns beta are associated with
accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth so that I fail to
reject the hypothesis that they are not associated. That is, Hypothesis 3 has only mixed
support. Again, this might indicate the failure to control for other factors explaining the
expected rate of return.
To investigate the possiblity that unexplained factors might explain the previous results,
I again examine the differences between the valuation errors for accounting beta and stock
returns beta across quintile portfolios for both accounting conservatism and past investment
growth. Table 5.8 presents the results of testing the valuation error differences. Consistent
with the main set of results, the valuation error differences for accounting beta and stock
returns beta are increasingly positive for portfolios of firms having more conservative ac-
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Table 5.6: Firm-Specific Valuation Error Estimation with Fama-MacBeth Adjustment
(rpeg,it − rft) = γ0 + γ1βi,t + γ2ln (mveit) + γ3mbit + υit
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 Adj. R
2
βroeit 0.0344** -0.0004 0.2581
(10.73) (-1.18)
0.0617** -0.0003 -0.0039** -0.0003 0.3187
(14.40) (-0.77) (-11.29) (-1.20)
βretit 0.0253** 0.0076** 0.2688
(5.58) (4.93)
0.0512** 0.0073** -0.0036** -0.0002 0.0092
(8.99) (5.03) (-9.64) (-0.60)
Notes: The table presents the coefficient estimates from Fama-
MacBeth regressions of an implied cost of equity capital using a
PEG ratio (rpeg) on each beta risk measure. rpeg equals the square
root of the difference between 3-year-ahead and 2-year-ahead earnings
forecasts, scaled by current price. Accounting beta (βroeit ) is the slope
coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess return
on equity (ROE) on estimated excess market portfolio ROE. Stock
returns beta (βretit ) is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly
regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the excess market portfolio
stock return. I estimate the Fama-MacBeth regressions by calen-
dar year. (t-values are in parentheses. ** denotes significance at
p < 0.01.)
counting and greater absolute values of past investment growth. The difference between
the valuation error differences for the portfolio of firms having the highest proportion of
conservative investment and highest absolute value of average past investment growth and
the portfolio of firms having the lowest proportion of conservative investment and lowest
absolute past investment growth is approximately a rate of return equal to 0.2%. Therefore,
even after Fama-MacBeth adjustment, the differences between the accounting beta and
stock returns beta valuation errors are in the anticipated direction.
5.3 Summary
I am unable to draw clear conclusions from the independent valuation error analyses.
Although I continue to find that the valuation error differences between accounting beta and
stock returns beta are positively associated with accounting conservatism and the absolute
value of past investment growth, regressions analyses that directly examine the accounting
beta distortions are less clear. The realized return analysis and the implied cost of equity
capital analysis yield inconsistent associations between betas and accounting conservatism
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Table 5.7: rpeg Valuation Error Tests with Fama-MacBeth Adjustment











Conservatismi,t ∗ |PInvesti,t| -0.001 0.003
(-0.16) (0.53)
Adj.R2 0.021 0.017
Notes: This table presents the results of Fama-MacBeth regres-
sions of valuation errors for accounting beta (βroeit ) or stock returns
beta (βretit ) on accounting conservatism (Conservatismit ) and
the absolute value of past investment growth (PInvestit). The
valuation errors are the residuals (υit) from regressions of implied
cost of equity capital using a PEG ratio (rpeg) on each beta risk
measure, controlling for size and growth. Accounting beta (βroeit )
is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s
excess return on equity (ROE) on estimated excess market port-
folio ROE. Stock returns beta (βretit ) is the slope coefficient from
a 5-year monthly regression of a firm’s excess stock return on the
excess market portfolio stock return. Conservatismit equals R&D
and advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit|
is the geometric average of past total investment growth over
the estimated average useful life of a firm’s assets. t-values are
in parentheses. *, and ** denote significance at p < 0.05 and
p < 0.01, respectively.
66
Table 5.8: rpeg Valuation Error Differences (Fama-MacBeth)
υroeit − υretit
|PInvestit|
Conservatismit 1 2 3 4 5 (5− 1)
1 -0.0011 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0007 0.0017
(-6.74) (-4.95) (-1.87) (-0.48) (2.79) (6.03)
2 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0010 0.0017
(-4.79) (-3.17) (-1.62) (-2.48) (4.29) (6.17)
3 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0009 0.0014
(-3.18) (-2.93) (-1.48) (-2.14) (3.63) (4.74)
4 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0014 0.0018
(-2.25) (-0.87) (-1.65) (-0.45) (5.92) (6.15)
5 -0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0007 0.0016 0.0019
(-1.25) (2.39) (1.12) (2.84) (6.09) (5.64)
(5− 1) 0.0008 0.0014 0.0006 0.0008 0.0009 0.0027
(3.27) (4.97) (2.09) (2.43) (2.61) (8.70)
Notes: This table presents the mean differences between valuation errors for
accounting beta and stock returns beta across quintiles for accounting con-
servatism (Conservatismit) and the absolute value of past investment growth
(|PInvestit|). Valuation errors are estimated as the residuals (υit) from Fama-
MacBeth regressions of excess implied cost of equity capital estimated using
a PEG ratio (rpeg) on either accounting beta or stock return beta, including
controls for size and growth. rpeg equals the square root of the difference
between three-year ahead and 2-year ahead earnings forecasts, scaled by current
price. I calculate rpeg in excess of the risk free rate, which I estimate using the
de-annualized monthly reported yield from a 10-year treasury bond. Accounting
beta is the slope coefficient from a 10-year yearly regression of a firm’s excess
return on equity (ROE) on the estimated excess market portfolio ROE. Stock
returns beta is the slope coefficient from a 5-year monthly regression of a firm’s
excess stock return on the excess market portfolio stock return. Conservatismit
equals R&D and advertising expenses divided by total investments. |PInvestit|
is the geometric average of past total investment growth over the estimated
average useful life of a firm’s assets. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The
t-statistics for the portfolio differences presented in the last row and last column
assume unequal variances. The two numbers in the last row and last column
evaluate the differences between the highest Conservatismit and |PInvestit|
portfolio and the lowest Conservatismit and |PInvestit| portfolio.
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and the absolute value of past investment growth. Stock returns beta also demonstrates
an inconsistent association. Because of this, I conclude that the simple regressions of
expected rates of return on each beta estimate are likely misspecified and that the consistent




I examine how one broad set of accrual recognition methods, which I label conservative
accounting, might affect risk analysis in valuation. I restrict my examination to the effects
of conservative accounting on rate of return estimates that are derived from the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM represents a traditional approach to modeling
investment risk based on the covariance between an investment’s return and the return
obtained from a market-mimicking investment portfolio. Although prior literature suggests
that the CAPM might not adequately model investment risk as implied by market returns, I
focus on the CAPM in my analysis for two reasons. First, as stated previously, an objective
of accounting is to provide the observables necessary to proxy for the key parameters among
the set of risk models that are used by investors. Despite its limitations, the CAPM remains
among the most popular risk models used by corporate managers to assess risk (Graham
& Harvey, 2001). Second, recent literature suggests that the CAPM, when derived using
accounting estimates of firm and market portfolio returns, yields, on average, superior risk
estimates than when it is derived using stock market estimates of firm and market portfolio
returns.
I extend the prior literature by predicting that accounting betas are not only a function
of a firm’s systematic risk, but also of its firm-specific accrual accounting methods. I
examine whether the on-average superior performance of accounting betas over stock return
betas is associated with a firm’s level of conservative accounting methods. I predict that
conservative accounting, when combined with past investment growth, biases accounting
betas so that firms having more conservative accounting appear less risky than they truly
are. Consequently, I also predict that accounting betas, when estimated for firms having
more conservative accounting, will, on average, yield larger valuation errors than stock
return betas that are estimated across the same set of firms.
I define conservative accounting as the set of accrual methods that reports an investment
at a carrying value that yields an accounting rate of return greater than the internal rate
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of return based on the investment’s original cost. I predict that because conservative
accounting distorts accounting rates of return, it might also distort accounting betas.
I provide evidence consistent with my predictions. Specifically, I find that accounting
betas are negatively associated with accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past
investment growth. I also provide evidence that accounting betas yield larger valuation er-
rors relative to stock returns beta in the presence of more conservative accounting combined
with greater magnitudes of past investment growth. I document evidence that these results
are insensitive to alternative measures for valuation errors and stock returns and accounting
betas. I also find evidence that the results are not strictly driven by a few industries.
In further analysis, I attempt to examine accounting beta valuation errors independent
of stock returns beta valuation errors. I obtain puzzling results that suggest that both
accounting beta and stock returns beta valuation errors are negatively associated with
accounting conservatism and the absolute value of past investment growth. The negative
association disappears once I include a control for firm size. Because of this, I conclude
that the simple regressions of expected rates of return on each beta estimate are likely
misspecified and that the differencing tests between accounting beta and stock returns beta
provide a solution to the misspecification problem.
Other areas for future research include examining other potential accounting distor-
tions to accounting risk measures including accounting beta. In addition to examining
distortions related to accounting conservatism, future research might examine distortions
related to conditional accounting conservatism. Conditional accounting conservatism relates
to accounting policies that make it more difficult to recognize positive performance than
negative performance. For example, if poor performance is recognized when expected while
positive performance news is recognized when realized, then ROE might better reflect actual
market risk when calculated during periods with marketwide positive returns. Alternatively,
investors’ expectations might be more important to measuring market risk, especially for
short-term investors.
Future research might examine the effects of earnings management on accounting risk
measures. Another avenue of research might examine the risk-assessment quality of IFRS
relative to GAAP since some prior research suggests IFRS might be less conservative
(Ahmed, Neel, & Wang, 2009). Future research could also examine whether a combination of
accounting-based and stock returns-based risk measures might overcome specific or general
measurement distortions. Finally, research might also examine methods for redefining
accounting betas or other accounting risk measures to avoid measurement distortions.
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In summary, I contribute to the literature by exploring the extent to which accrual
accounting methods distort accounting beta risk estimates. To my knowledge, I am the
first to examine the association between accounting measurement attributes and accounting
beta risk estimates. I document evidence that investors should consider firms’ accrual
accounting methods when assessing firm risk using accounting-based estimates. Further,
when evaluating the relative valuation errors of accounting-based and market-based risk
estimates, my results suggest that the relative superiority of accounting-based risk estimates
is contextual. While prior research suggests that, on average, accounting beta estimates
are superior to stock return beta estimates, my findings suggests that by understanding the
impact of accounting conservatism and investment growth on accounting betas, practitioners
and researchers can better choose the appropriate risk measure. My results suggest that
(1) accounting betas are negatively biased by conservative accounting and (2) that stock
return betas provide a superior meaure of risk over accounting betas for firms that use more
conservative accounting during periods of highly fluctuating economic growth.
APPENDIX
A DEMONSTRATION OF THE THEORY
To help illustrate the association among accounting rates of return, changes in net
investment growth, and conservative accounting treatment and also to help motivate my
hypotheses regarding the related rate of return effects upon earnings betas, I provide several
examples using an all-equity firm that pays its entire earnings as dividends each period.1
Each year-end, the firm invests in assets having a rate of return equal to the firm’s 10%
cost of capital. The assets have 2-year productive lives that the firm splits equally over 2
years. For simplification, I assume operating expenses consist solely of depreciation so that
the rate of return effects of conservatism and growth are demonstrated by varying both the
firms’ depreciation schedule and its new investment growth rate. Because I assume the firm
is financed entirely by equity, the return on net operating assets (RNOA) provided in each
example is equivalent to the firm’s return on equity (ROE).
In the first set of examples provided in Table A.1, I compare a “neutral accounting”
firm in Panel A to a “conservative accounting” firm in Panel B. The neutral accounting
firm depreciates its investments equally over their 2-year productive lives. In contrast, the
conservative accounting firm depreciates its new investments by 60% in the purchase year,
30% in the first productive year, and 10% in the second productive year. To demonstrate
the joint effects of conservatism and changes to investment growth on the firm’s RNOA ,
the firm’s investment growth steadily rises and falls in each example.
Panel A shows that when investments are expensed in accordance with their productive
lives, RNOA remains unchanged despite changes to investment growth rates. The firm’s
sales correspond to its operating expenses so that neither current-period earnings nor
subsequent period book values are biased, allowing RNOA to remain constant over time as
growth rates change. Further, firm RNOA properly reflects the firm’s cost of capital.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B is slightly more complicated. Focusing on periods subsequent to 2001, the first
notable difference between Panel A and Panel B is that RNOA appears much higher in
Panel B. In general, the higher RNOA occurs because conservative accounting treatment
records net assets at less than their true holding values so that the same net income each
period appears generated from fewer net assets from the prior period. However, rather than
RNOA levels, my hypotheses relate to the changes in RNOA as a firm alters its investment
growth rates. From 2002 to 2004, as the firm grows its net investments, RNOA decreases
from 0.29 to 0.22. The decrease occurs because conservatism combines with the increased
rate of investment to cause current period expenses to grow at a faster rate than the decline
in prior period book values. Similarly, from 2008 to 2010, RNOA increases because the
slowing rate of investment reduces current period expenses faster than the reduction in
prior period book values. When investment growth remains unchanged, as in periods 2005
to 2007, RNOA stabilizes as the year-over-year proportion of current period net income to
prior period book value remains constant. In summary, RNOA decreases as conservative
accounting firms increase their investment growth rates and it increases as conservative
accounting firms decrease their investment growth rates. RNOA remains unchanged when
conservative accounting firms do not change their investment growth rates.
My hypotheses relate to how conservatism and changes to investment growth rates
are associated with the systematic variation in earnings betas. Table A.1 shows how
conservatism and investment growth can produce greater variation in firms’ RNOA. The
example, however, does not yet clearly portray how conservatism and changes to investment
growth rates might affect earnings betas. The reason is that the firm’s rate of return is not
yet associated with the market so as to provide an indication of comovement between firm
accounting rates of returns and the accounting rate of return from a market portfolio.
For simplification, I assume market portfolio performance is perfectly correlated with
the firm’s changing investment growth rates.2 Table A.2 provides two additional examples
where firm sales are now also a function of market performance. Firm investments earn
a rate of return equal to the firm’s cost of capital plus a premium corresponding to the
performance of the market. I initially set the market premium equal to 100 in 2001, and
then allow the premium to adjust to the marketwide growth thereafter. For years 2002,
2003, and 2004, the market premium is 101, 104, and 109, corresponding to the 1%, 3%,
2In my hypotheses for earnings beta, I similarly assume that firms having rates of return that comove with
the market will also have investment rates that comove with the market. The assumption is consistent with
firms having, on average, procyclical rates of investment where firms have higher short-term rate-of-return

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and 5% year-over-year perfectly correlated growth in investment. All other assumptions for
Panels A and B are the same as before.
In Panel A, the firm’s RNOA is nearly perfectly correlated with market growth rate,
consistent with the firm earning a premium on investment that is perfectly correlated with
the market.3 For neutral accounting firms, the higher rate of return is appropriately matched
with the investment of the prior period. For conservative accounting firms, however, the
correlation changes. In Panel B, RNOA is nearly perfectly negatively correlated with the
market. Due to the interaction effects between conservatism and investment growth, RNOA
continues to move opposite the market. The effects would be less (more) pronounced for
less (more) conservative accounting treatment.
Earnings betas measure firm risk as the comovement between a firm’s rate of the
return and the market rate of return. If firm’s vary cross-sectionally in their conservative
accounting treatment and investment growth rates, the conservative accounting firms may
appear less risky than their underlying operations would imply based on a CAPM model
of risk. Using RNOA in Panel A as a proxy for the market portfolio, the earnings beta
for Panel B equals -0.14, compared to 1 for Panel A. If the firm in Panel A more closely
proxies the market, the example suggests that the firm in Panel B would have a negative
earnings beta even though the two firms are identical except for their depreciation methods.
Consequently, I predict that firms having greater changes to their investment growth rates
and more conservative accounting have smaller earnings betas than firms with more stable
investment growth and more neutral accounting methods.
3I exclude the 2000 and 2001 data from the correlation calculations.
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